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Since after every climb, the downward path generally follows, undoubtedly, the
economic downturn of 2008-09 was being anticipated as much by forecasting
wizards as by rational men. Yet, the world economy was taken aback when the
crisis happened as was the maritime community by the shipping crisis which
followed. Why is this so?
The initial shocks of the financial crisis on the shipping industry were deemed
‘natural’. However, neither the individual shipping market segments nor all the
firms making up those specific market segments were affected identically. Since
shipping cycles are inherent to industry, should not the market be simply allowed to
readjust itself? Why did government intervention become so critical?
In this context, investment in ships is and will remain a critical issue for the
industry on all fronts, particularly the shipbuilding market. Such a crisis may
happen once in a while, since it has a cyclical nature, but its effects on companies is
relatively short compared to the long term effects it may have on the lives of people
throughout the world. Thus, these seemingly simple investment decisions taken at
corporate levels have the power to trigger far reaching consequences that easily
transcend national barriers, as witnessed by the global crisis of 2008-09.
On the whole, by using a mixed methodology, the dissertation, attempts to examine
the relationships between shipping cycles and the reaction of the shipping industry
to crises. By analysing the effects of the current crisis on individual shipping
markets and shipping market segments the merits of government intervention under
special circumstances is emphasised. The value of effective information flow and
continuous review and improvement of risk management strategies in cushioning
the world economy against similar shocks in future is also acknowledged.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
1.1 Shipping Crisis: Down the beaten path
´´If you do not like recessions, you should not be in shipping!``, (Stopford, 2001,
p.2). In other words, crises are normal occurrences in shipping. Indeed, the history
of maritime transport is marked by a number of similar occurrences with the great
depression of the 1930’s and the depression of the 1980’s being the most devastating
ones until recently.
In fact, today the difference from former ones is being seriously dwelled on as the
maritime industry goes through its present global downturn, which is being critically
viewed by many as a ´´gratuitous and unnecessary tragedy``, like the depression of
the 1930’s (Krugman, 2008, p.3), and one of the greatest puzzles of this new era.

1.2 Background
1.2.1. Shipping markets
Earnestly engaged in providing transport services to facilitate international trade, the
shipping industry is a highly specialised sector of the world’s economy. It is made up
of four sub-markets, namely the new building market, the sale and purchase market,
the freight market and the demolition market. As may be inferred by the appellation
of the markets, the new building market trades new ships and the sale and purchase
market deals in second hand ships. The freight market is concerned with finding
employment for ships in service while the demolition market services are sought
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upon the expiry of the vessels’ useful economic life, which generally spans a period
of at least twenty years.

1.2.2. Shipping market segments
Within the four shipping markets, there is further sub-division into specific market
segments based on technical requirements for goods and services trade. The
specialised market segments include general cargo ships, dry bulk carriers, reefers,
tankers and containerships.
Built for carriage of a particular type of cargo, the market segments of particular
ships are affected by the changes in that specific commodity market accordingly. In
this study, the focus will be on the containership, dry bulk and tanker market
segment.

1.2.3. Uniqueness of the industry
Investment in ships is riskier than in other assets. This is mainly the consequence of
the highly capital intensive nature of the industry, coupled with its inherent
cyclicality (Cushing, 1997, p.2; Ma, 2008, p.5).
Also, in the shipping industry, contrary to the classic theory based on Say’s law,
supply does not create its own demand. It is the prospect of high earnings potential
at a given time which encourages ship owners to invest in building ships. However,
the time taken between the order being placed and the actual delivery date in the long
run offers no guarantee to the owners for recovering their investment.
Moreover, being operational on the high seas and international waters in facilitating
trade, another unique characteristic of the shipping industry is its openness and the
possibility of free entry and free exit. As such, though the industry may be a
significant pillar of the economy for many maritime nations, government
intervention in commercial shipping policies has more often been limited.
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1.3 Economics of sea transport
1.3.1. Demand and supply for shipping services
Unlike, normal consumer goods and services, the low cost of sea transport does not
automatically imply greater use of sea transport services. Its price elasticity is
therefore relatively low. In other words, demand for shipping services is not for
itself. Instead, driven by the economic needs of nations separated by oceans, demand
for shipping services is derived from international trade (Chrzanowski, 1985, p.52:
Ma, 2008, p.4). Shipping is, therefore, not only affected by the dynamics within the
industry but also by changes in the broader macro-economy.
On the other hand, the supply of shipping services is determined by the size and
structure of the fleet in service, the average time of operations and productivity of
shipping while the supply of fleet itself, is affected by how confident ship owners
feel about ordering new tonnage, guided by the freight market and availability of
finance (Chrzanowski,1985, p.54).
In theory, the shipping industry is known to operate under conditions of competitive
markets which entail the interaction of large numbers of buyers and sellers in the
trade of a homogenous product, which is sea transport services, and allowing the free
entry and free exit of investors given that information flow is assumed to be fluid.
When the industry operates at a level where the earnings exceed the operational
costs, it attracts new investors. As the share of the industry’s aggregate profit gets
constantly eroded with the entry of subsequent new entrants over time, in parallel a
point is reached as gradually the supply of services exceeds the aggregate demand so
that the price of the service offered is lowered to a level where operating costs are
barely met. At this point, speculative investors leave the market. Slowly, the industry
recovers from the depressed market conditions and restores its equilibrium position
whereby earnings from operating activities cover its operating costs. In the long run,
demand builds up as the global economy flourishes, existing operators again benefit
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from abnormal profits which is shortly followed by the influx of speculative
investors as the merry-go-round continues. In theory, this is basically how the
dynamics of the free market is believed to regulate itself over time.
However, theoretical frameworks in economics are based on assumptions that all
other factors remain constant as the change and resulting implication in one element
is observed as commonly provided for by use of the Latin phrase ´´ceteris paribus``,
(term used to denote the assumption that ´´all else remaining constant``). Similarly,
in shipping economics, the lives of investors in ships are not as easy as may be
thought based on the theory of competitive markets.

1.3.2. Shipping cycles and shipping risks
´´Just as the weather dominates the lives of seafarers, so the waves of the shipping
cycle ripple through the financial lives of ship owners`` (Stopford, 1997, p.38). In
parallel, Kavussanos (2002, p.661), in his paper entitled ´´Business risk measurement
and management in the cargo carrying sector of the shipping industry``, provides a
very concise listing of the commercial decisions that ship owners normally have to
face, ranging from the most favourable timing to entering the industry, the most
suitable means of financing investment in ships at that point of time to the kind of
contracts they should secure for employment of the vessels. This clearly illustrates
the extent to which variable economic conditions influence investment decisions in
the industry and how far risks are all pervasive as operators struggle to survive under
the prevailing conditions of uncertainty.
In the shipping business, what is termed as ´´shipping risk`` essentially revolves
around the huge capital investment that is involved. If vessels are limited, the ship
owners make a fortune but when there is excess tonnage in the market, investors
have to bear the high opportunity costs of vessels being idle. Therefore, as observed
by Kavussanos (2002, p.688), shipping risks mainly emanate from fluctuations in
freight rates and bunker prices which subsequently affect the price of the investment,
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which is obviously the main concern of ship owners and potential investors. In
shipping investment theory, it is this interplay of free market conditions and shipping
risks which creates the famous shipping cycles. In fact, for ship owners who
contribute to the industry as cargo carriers, shipping cycles implies the need for
contingency plans while for those owners who invest in ships as if it is a commodity
and are, therefore, driven by high gains from asset play, view shipping cycles as vital
``cyclical swings of fortune `` (Drewry, 2004, p.6; Drewry 1999, p.5).
Figure 1 is a vivid portrayal of the earlier analogy of Stopford whereby he associates
shipping cycles with sea waves and the dynamic market environment shipping
practitioners are engaged in.

Figure 1: Stages in a typical shipping market cycle
Source: Stopford, M. (2008, p.97). Maritime Economics. Routledge.

5

Unlike other goods and services traded, there is a significant time difference between
the demand placed for new ships and their actual delivery. Consequently, prompted
by this lag, the varying fluctuations which characterise the shipping cycles are simply
reactions of the market as cash flow is constantly adjusted to remove imbalances in
demand and supply for ships over the span of time (Stopford, 1997, pp.40-42). As
may be deduced, therefore, it is fundamentally cash flow which eventually paves the
way for the famous shipping market cycles.

1.3.2. Shipping finance
Figure 2 clearly shows the importance of finance in binding the four shipping
markets.

Figure 2: The critical linkage between the four shipping markets and finance
Source: Stopford, M. (2008, p.179). Maritime Economics. Routledge.
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As so wisely and concisely pointed out by Stopford (2002, p.204), while the shipping
cycles reflect the heart beat of the industry, from figure 2, it is evident that cash flow
or finance is the ´´life-blood`` link that connects and feeds the clusters that make up
the shipping industry.
This analogy could not be more suited to describe any previous crises as it does for
the current global recession whereby it is being claimed by most that the downturn in
shipping related investments was forced on the industry by virtue of the turmoil in
the financial markets which preceded it.
In reality, irrespective of the methods of financing used in shipping, be it through
equity financing, loan financing or leasing, the present global downturn has shown
how the vulnerability of financial markets can cause unforeseen turbulence in the
shipping industry. Clearly, therefore, as applicable to any commercially oriented
enterprise, finance is and remains the main driving force behind the shipping
industry’s raison d’être as well as its continued existence and growth.

1.3.3. The shipping and financial crisis linkage
By virtue of competitive markets, whereby market cycles are common occurrences,
shipping crises are regular features of the shipping industry. However, unlike in other
markets, as clearly explained by Thanopoulou (2002, pp. 623-641), the fluctuations
in asset prices in any market is not comparable to the value of ships which can reach
levels no more than a meagre fraction of its acquisition price during recessionary
periods. This state of affairs raises the concerns not only of investors in ships but also
financing institutions who provide the funds for the investment. For instance, in
cases whereby ships are mortgaged as collateral security for the loan, the sudden
significant fall in their value implies that the ships are no longer an equivalent
measure of security. Additional collateral security is usually required to
commensurate the value of the debt finance as agreed through the covenants included
in the loan agreement.

7

As established earlier on, the changing value of investments in ships is driven mainly
by fluctuations in freight rate. In an attempt to reduce such risk exposures, risk
management became a must for the shipping industry in the early 1980’s. In line with
this philosophy, risk management techniques, such as hedging using futures,
forwards and options, which had been successfully applied in the commodity and
financial markets earlier, were introduced in the shipping business (Nomikos &
Alizadeh, 2002, p.693).

1.3.4. Emerging issues
Since the industry is familiar with shipping cycles after a history of 5, 000 years, it is
expected that it should be reasonable by now to assume that investment in shipping
may be conducted in such a way that potentially significant losses are minimised in
the future. In fact, for this purpose the research departments of the reputed ship
broking houses have become major players in compiling shipping statistics for the
industry. These published statistics are continuously updated to reflect the prevailing
market conditions daily and to assist shipping investors in appraising their
investment activities. Surprisingly, still, the shipping industry has been once again
unsuccessful in containing the damage caused by the current crisis. Consequently,
government intervention, which is usually snubbed in the industry, became a must
and the efficiency of existing and sophisticated risk management tools was
challenged.

1.4 Objectives of the research
The objectives of this research are to:
a. analyse the relationship between the shipping and financial crisis;
b. study the impact of the current crisis on shipping markets;
c. understand the difference in response of the different market segments as a
guide for future investment in shipping;
d. analyse the usefulness of shipping statistics in guiding investment decisions;
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e. appreciate how far government intervention is truly needed or is desirable in
shipping, and
f. determine how far risk management is possible in commercial shipping
investment activities

1.5 Structure
The dissertation introduces the key concepts and issues on the subject matter.
Chapter 2 consists of a critical review of the relevant literature.
Chapter 3 explains the methods used to achieve the objectives of the study.
Chapter 4 summarises the findings of the applied methodology to validate theoretical
arguments being established using qualitative and quantitative research tools.
Chapter 5 concludes the discussion.
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Chapter 2 – Does history repeat itself in shipping?
‘’ Adversity reveals genius, prosperity conceals it`` (Horace)

2.1 Global crisis 2008/9
Undoubtedly, the global recession of 2008-09 is a feast for shipping analysts. This
current global downturn offers not only new challenges to shipping practitioners in
surviving this ordeal, but also new insights and key issues to be urgently addressed
by the industry.
As indicated in the previous chapter, a number of questions have been raised and are
being deliberated. The shipping industry is now in a recession, so what? Is the
current shipping crisis any different from previous crises? Is it really a disaster for
the industry or is it more of a ´´blessing in disguise``? Why did the dry bulk market
crash so suddenly? Why did the other market segments not do so? How useful were
shipping statistics as a decision-support to investors? Why did the Group of 20,
commonly referred to as the G20 (established in 1999), an international forum made
up of finance ministers and central bank governors, join forces again to deliberate on
the current crisis in June 2009? Shipping cycles are a common phenomenon in this
industry, so should the market not be allowed to regulate itself? Were there not
reasonable risk management strategies in place to protect the industry against such
adversity?
In order to respond to these questions in an objective manner, a review of the
literature is important.
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2.2 The current global crisis and former crises
In its documented commercial history, which spans over a period of 5,000 years, the
shipping industry is reported to have been through 22 shipping cycles (Stopford,
2007, p.2). Interestingly, the predicament of the containerships and dry bulk
segments today seems to be a repetition of the 1970’s whereby optimism in orders
placed resulted in tankers being moved from builder’s yard straight into lay up
(Chrzanowski, 1985, p.4).
It is reported that in 2001, shipbuilding capacity, which had been cut back in the
1980’s, grew so rapidly that those ship owners who were used to selling 10-year old
vessels for as much as the ships’ original new building cost had to face a 60% fall in
their assets’ real worth (Stopford, 2003, p. 3). Similarly, at the end of June 2009, a
5-year old Capesize vessel was worth 30% of the value it was worth in 2008.
Based on Stopford’s critical review of the last crisis, what is going on today, eight
years later, seems a replay of what happened after the boom of 2000. In fact, today
once again the same question is being asked. ´´How deep and how long ``(Stopford,
2001, p.4) is the global downturn going to last?
Oddly, in spite of the many parallels with the former crises, Alan Greenspan, former
Chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve, still referred to the downturn as a ´´once-in-acentury-credit tsunami`` (Allen, 2008). Even Erskine Harkey’s presentation at the
Covenant Men’s Club in April 2009 acknowledged the current downturn as ´´the
once-in-a-lifetime recession``. It was Harkey’s explanation of the merit of
diversification as a risk management strategy vis-à-vis former crises which justified
his perception of the current crisis. Actually, when the financial tsunami hit the world
in 2008, it was a fact that even diversification based on the popular portfolio theory
(Cariou, 2009, p.33), which is essentially about spreading risk by investing in assets
with differing risk and return combination, was ineffective in cushioning the shock.
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2.3 Bane or boon?
Broadly, there seemed to be general consensus in the industry to the saying by Mr.
K. Matsushita, founder of the Panasonic Group, ´´ Boom is welcome. Recession is
more welcome`` (Jacques, 2008, p.2; Lampert, 2008, p3; Karatzas, 2008, p.39;
Luthwaithe, 2008, p.10; Rogers, 2009; Svenning, 2008; Woodbridge, 2008, p.3).
This philosophy is based upon the belief that ´´shipping cycles have a Darwinian
purpose`` (Stopford, 2009, p.99). It is held that the recessionary phases of recessions
create an environment which forces weak operators out of business and leaves
behind a more efficient and vibrant industry to prosper.
Nevertheless, in spite of the evidently positive approach of the key players in the
industry, one cannot disregard the direct and immediate consequences of recessions
and in particular the current global recession. According to the latest update provided
by Salomon, R. (2009, January), the number of so-called ´´notable` bankruptcies
amounted to 108 companies by the end of 2008 while the filings cases increased by
42% from June 2007 to June 2008. These figures are a clear indicator of the level of
unemployment that is being generated as the world economic recession drags on.
Obviously these bankruptcies have no direct impact on the shipping industry but they
certainly have a lagging impact. Loss of employment implies loss of income. Lower
aggregate income levels implies a lower level of spending which indirectly implies a
lower demand for shipping services that will most likely prolong the ongoing
shipping crisis.
Suppose the focus is kept on the shipping industry. The impact of the crisis and its
implications on shipyards is clearly demonstrated in the case of China and South
Korea.

2.4 Shipping markets & selected shipping market segments
In his study of the independence of shipping markets, Prof. Volk, B. (2002) shows
how a sound understanding of the underlying relationship between freight rates, new
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buildings and second hand vessel prices influences the timing as well as the level of
investment in specific market segments. He concludes by stating that mistakes made
in shipping investment are therefore, in his opinion, the consequence of an
insufficient understanding of the freight rate fluctuations under conditions of
competitive markets. Stopford (2001, p.6), also relates the rise and fall of freight
rates. His analysis of the performance of individual market segments is explained in
terms of whether cycles are demand driven or supply dampened cycles against the
backdrop of broader macroeconomic market conditions. The volatility in oil prices
over time influences investment in tankers, the dry bulk trade relies on iron ore and
coal trade prospects, while the containership market is dependent on the purchasing
power of the consumers of manufactured goods.
Though the shipping industry in general is considered to operate under conditions of
perfectly competitive markets, the market structure under which the individual
shipping market segments operate differs considerably. The dry bulk sector retains
the characteristics of the perfectly competitive market as there are no barriers to
entry. The shipping services by bulkers are homogenous. The existence of the Baltic
Exchange Dry Index as a barometer of the prevailing market freight rate ensures that
free market conditions are met as no single buyer or seller can influence the freight
dictated by the market.
On the other hand, investment in the tanker trade requires compliance to a number of
safety regulations and the implied liability implications in case of pollution are far
more significant. Moreover, the nature of the commodity traded encourages long
term contracts. Although there are a number of independent tanker owners in the
industry, the common practice is to charter their vessels to reputed oil companies on
long term contracts. These special requirements limit the number of market
operators, which is similar to the conditions of the monopoly (only one supplier)
market structure; as well as to the conditions of the perfectly competitive market
where the services provided by tankers are deemed homogenous (ICS, 2002, p.111)
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as the World Scale Index ensures that oil companies do not practice price
discrimination, thus giving the appearance that the tanker market is operating under
conditions of monopolistic competition.
Lastly, it is held that the container trade operates under conditions of oligopolistic
competition (Chrzanowski, 1985, pp.56-60; Kavussanos, 2002, p.665). Under the
oligopolistic market structure, there is increased emphasis on product/service
differentiation. In the container trade, the schedule and frequency of service is fixed
and regular. Incidentally, speed, reliability and quality of service become critical
elements of product/service differentiation. Although the service being provided is
basically the same, the brand name and the efficiency of the company becomes a
more critical factor in influencing shippers’ choice of the services offered.
Moreover, unlike the other two market segments, freight rates in the container trade
are not synchronised through international measures like the Baltic Dry Index or the
World Scale Index; the prices being fixed at the discretion of the liner companies.
Surprisingly, the rates are usually very similar. If one supplier reduces its freight rate
to capture a greater share of the market, others will follow suit so that in the long run,
it is in the interest of all parties to co-operate tacitly, as is observed in practice.

2.5 Shipping finance and statistics
Indeed ``shipping benefits from globalization more than almost any other sector``,
and is therefore more prone to be even more vulnerable to a global economic crisis,
(Schulz, 2008). However, in attempting to explain inter-alia, ``why some financial
crisis appear to be contagious`` , Rand’s monograph report (Lowell et al., 1998),
provides four contagion models, namely economic linkages, heightened awareness,
portfolio adjustment and herd behaviour.
The mentioned models show ``the different implications for the predictability and
preventability of multi-country crises …unfortunately, neither the causes of multicountry financial crises nor the mechanisms by which they are transmitted across
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borders are well understood. `` It was also reported that traditional warning signals
including unsettling macroeconomic and political developments were found to be of
little use in cushioning the industry from the aftershocks of such events. Similarly,
initially the linkage between the financial market crash and subsequent freight
market collapse seems unclear. Yet, in the Drewry (1998, p.1) publication it is
plainly stated that ´´shipping finance is more cyclical than the shipping industry
itself`` while, Lloyd-Lewis et al (2008, pp.63-65) clearly explained how globalisation
and growth of the global credit markets had influenced the speed of growth of the
shipping industry and its subsequent doom during the current crisis
As far as shipping statistics is concerned, their predictive value is declared to be
limited. In fact, as Dr. Martin Stopford, the Managing Director of Clarkson Research
(one of the leading providers of integrated shipping services) says, ´´ lately
forecasters had not had much luck predicting the length and timing of shipping
cycles`` (Stopford, 2004, p. 3). How far, then, can shipping statistics be expected to
be reliable measures in developing suitable risk management strategies in the future?
Similarly, some shipping people look at statistics simply as historical data with
limited value in planning for the future (Bharati, 2009, p.10). Ironically, by listing
the number of crises having taken place since 1973, Stopford (2007, p. 5) pointes out
that crises in shipping occur at an average interval of six years and that the year 2007
was apparently the sixth year since the last one. Today, looking back and pondering
over Stopford’s reflections, while actually experiencing the repercussion of the
global crisis 2008/09, should his analytical approach be reckoned as merely a stroke
of luck or indeed the potential of statistics as a reliable guiding tool for future
investment in shipping?

2.6 Government intervention
Though state interference is not usually favoured by the shipping industry (Basey,
2009, p.19), it is important for governments to understand the fundamentals of the
industry to ensure that it is supported in an optimal manner.
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As argued by Gray, T. (2009, July), shipbuilders may not be held responsible for
taking on new building contracts. In parallel shipping banks may not be blamed for
supporting the industry in its investment activities. Both parties are driven by the
commercial needs of the market. They are not regulatory bodies. Similarly, as long
as a particular market produces good returns, investors will continue to invest.
Alternatively stated, shipping cycles are not created consciously by the dominant
players given that they are themselves unaware of the likely ceiling or floor. It is, in
fact, the interplay of market forces of demand and supply under conditions of
uncertainty, commonly referred to as the ´´invisible hand``, which actually trace the
route of shipping freight rates.
The global crisis of 2008-09 is a clear case of market failure. Market failure
generates externalities. For instance, if ship yards in Asia close down, this will not
only affect financial issues associated with the shortfall in funding new buildings,
and the likelihood of cancelled orders, but also social problems, since these local ship
yards provide economic support to whole communities.
One way of internalizing the spill-over effects of market failure is through
government intervention. Stokes (1997) firmly emphasised the increasing importance
of governments’ as guarantors of finance for newbuildings during the past decades.
Under the present conditions, Earle (2009, p.788) asserts that ´´only government
intervention, guaranteeing the value of assets and establishing confidence, could
break the gridlock`` and indeed the outcome of the G20, (Group of 20), is said to
have surpassed expectations (Witherell, 2009).
In reality, as reported by the World Trade Organisation (ICS, 2009, p4), 17 of the
G20 nations seemed to have adopted protectionist measures. However, it is important
to bear in mind that, unlike regulations drafted for other domestic industries,
shipping requires States to tread with caution and come up with prudent government

16

policies. This is because the global nature of the industry can easily transform
genuine government intervention aiming to correct market failure into government
failure (Clarkson, 2009; Freight transport, 2009 July).

2.7 Risk management
During the past decade, ship-owners were fervently engaged in applying hedging
techniques in order to assess and manage risk in ship financing (Drewry, 1996, p.73).
Still, the current global crisis has been declared as one of the greatest risk
management failures in recent history (Earle, 2009, p.785). Applying the value-atrisk analysis to the dry bulk market, Lu et al’s (2007) insight of the lessons learnt
from financial crises is limited to the dollars lost due to the poor practice of risk
management. The present turbulence in commercial shipping has instead clearly
shown how deficiency in risk management has far wider implications than financial
loss (Lansley, 2009, p.1). In fact, as in the case of maritime casualties (O’Neil,
2000), it also affects the lives of people across the globe (Alave, 2009; Ayrazyan,
2009; Culpeper, 2009; Groom, 2009) as well as environmental policies (Tsang,
2009). In this vein, Stopford’s statement that ´´shipping companies, like ships, must
be built to survive storms`` (2007, p.14) and Maersk’s philosophy which says that
´´no loss should hit us, which could be avoided with constant care`` are surely wellfounded.
To conclude, as stated in the industry report of the NIB Capital Bank (2003, p.1),
even the most dominant market players of the shipping industry can neither stay,
escape nor change the course of shipping cycles. However, a better understanding of
the underlying dynamics might be a useful tool in enabling wiser investment and
mitigating future loss.
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Chapter 3 – Methodology
3.1 Selected research methods
As a result of the tested theories pertaining to crises and the current crisis being treated
as a unique one, a mixed method was used. The qualitative approach included the
distribution of an online questionnaire which focuses on gathering the opinions of
shipping people on the key issues and a loosely structured interview method. Results
obtained from the qualitative research methodology were supported by quantitative
method analyses to verify to which extent the views shared by the shipping community
actually hold true in practice.

3.2 Qualitative method part I- On line questionnaire Method
By definition, surveys attempt to gather information from a sample, which can then be
used to make inferences about the general population. To reconcile the differing
opinions to issues raised in the literature review, the questionnaire survey method was
adopted. A loosely structured interview method was also attempted as and when
possible within available resources and time allowed. The objective of using this
approach was to obtain additional information to support the initial responses of
shipping practitioners’ to issues addressed by the questionnaire which included their
experiences and opinions on crises in the shipping industry, reliability of statistics in
guiding investment decisions, desirability of government intervention in the shipping
industry and risk management issues.
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3.2.1 Structure of questionnaire
Bearing in mind the time constraints and complexity of the issue being addressed, the
questionnaire used consisted of 24 questions, out of which five were open ended
questions and the remainder were close ended questions (Appendix 1).

3.2.2 Mode of distribution and targeted audience
The postal questionnaire method is costly and time consuming to administer. As a
result the online questionnaire facility offered by the World Maritime University
(WMU) Web service was used and, where it was possible to follow up by interviews,
the duly filled-in questionnaires were personally collected.
Again, acknowledging the low response rate that is often associated with the
questionnaire method in general, the targeted audience was selected on convenience
sampling. Often online questionnaires are disregarded by recipients as electronic junk
mail (spam e-mails). In order to ensure that a reasonable response rate be obtained to
achieve the objective of the study, it was reckoned that the targeted audience should
recognise the value of the research. As such, visiting professors to the WMU and
former WMU graduates are not only experienced practitioners in the shipping industry
but also a group of potential participants who were more likely to appreciate and
contribute willingly to the research exercise.
In this vein, the distribution of the online questionnaire was limited to visiting
professors, professors at World Maritime University (WMU) and former WMU
graduates.

3.2.3 Response rate
The response rate was not expected to be 100% in spite of using selective sampling.
Since the age profile and background of the former WMU graduates is confidential
information, it was anticipated that some recipients of the link to the online
questionnaire may not be directly involved in the commercial aspects of the industry or
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they may have probably moved out of the industry. In the case of visiting professors,
the possibility that they might be out of office during the period the survey was
accessible online was also considered.
Overall, hundreds of e-mails were sent with the link and access code. In spite of the email addresses’ of the selected participants being available, it was not possible to
monitor the exact number of recipients who actually received the e-mails in order to
determine the actual sample size. Once the e-mails were sent, a fair number of
undelivered emails were received as a result of many former WMU students’ e-mail,
available from the University database, being no longer active. Likewise, prompt
notification of participants who were out of office was also recorded. Therefore, out of
the hundreds of emails sent initially, the actual sample size was considerably reduced.

3.2.4 Expected results
With questions addressed on the crises, performance of markets and market segments,
it was expected that responses would be biased to the markets the respondent may be
involved in as may be deduced by the introductory questions. On the statistics and risk
management issues, a favourable response was expected in general.

3.2.5 Merits and limitations
The merits of the online questionnaire were twofold. Firstly, it was addressed directly
to the respondents so that there were no intermediaries’ processes of the questionnaire
having to undergo a series of stages until it reached the targeted person. Also, with the
link and the access code being included, it ensured easy access and prompt submission
eliminating the risk of responses being lost or delayed as compared to the traditional
postal method. Moreover, confidentiality was totally assured. Secondly, the answers
collected being available in data form not only facilitated further analysis but also
eliminates the risk of errors that may be possible while feeding data manually.
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However, this method is still not devoid of some inherent limitations. A questionnaire,
the most commonly used method of collecting primary data, remains the one
associated with the lowest response rate, although, the reasons of being cumbersome
and costly, as in the case of a postal questionnaire, may not apply here. In this case,
possible reasons for a low response as mentioned earlier, may be the unavailability of
the respondents when the survey was open, the respondents having moved to some
other sector over time and probably due to limited interest in the issue being addressed.

3.3 Qualitative method part II - Interview
The interview, which is a face-to-face exchange with a particular participant, was used
to supplement the input obtained from the distribution of the online questionnaire. An
online questionnaire is a one-sided communication which allows the collection of data
in quantity but in case there are queries, for instance, one answer in one section not
being very compatible with the answer to some other leading question, it is not so clear
for further analysis or interpretation and important information may be lost. So,
following the questionnaire response by a face-to-face exchange, as and when possible,
allowed the flexibility to seek additional clarification and explanation as deemed
reasonable under the loosely structured interview method.

3.3.1 Loosely structured interview method
A loosely structured interview was convenient for this purpose as it was being used as
a supplement to the main method of collecting primary data, which was the online
questionnaire as described above. The duration of the questionnaire being filled in and
the interview which followed was split between 10 and 20-30 minutes respectively.
The interviews conducted were recorded with the approval of the respondents and
transcribed for analysis (Seidman, pp. 97-99). In situations where recording was not an
option, the notebook and pen option was used and the results were presented as briefs
on the key issues.
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3.3.2 Snowballing method
The selection of the participants for the interview was again based on purposive
sampling (Seidman, pp. 45-48). The e-mails addressed were to a broad range of
practitioners in the shipping industry. This is because it was understood that though the
financial crisis and investment in ships-related issues may be commercially oriented,
the impact of the crisis and its resulting implications affects one and all in the industry.
As such, having the views of shipping people from varying backgrounds would be
interesting and possibly worth considering in coming up with risk management
strategies in the future.
As such, the selected participants were from shipping companies, shipping finance
institutions, regulatory and educational bodies.

The opportunity of interviewing the chosen participant was made possible through the
use of the snowballing technique. This is especially convenient in cases whereby only
a few individuals are available as appropriate participants for the survey being
conducted. Consequently, as new dimensions of the issues are discussed in earlier
interviews, to ease the flow in collecting data, the names and addresses of others who
might also fit the sampling requirements are asked for; so that eventually one
participant leads to the next one based on the analogy of the increasing size of a
snowball when rolled down a snow-covered slope from which the technique derives its
name (Seidman, 1998, p.47). In this context, the purpose of using the snowballing
technique was twofold; firstly, to increase the sample size as may be inferred by its
definition, and secondly, to vary the selection of participants as such so that it be as
representative of the industry as could be.

3.3.3 Merits and limitations
The merit of the purposive sampling using the snowballing technique is that it ensures
a higher response rate than is usually possible if requests for interviews are addressed
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directly. The shipping industry being characterised as being secretive in sharing
information, trust becomes a critical criterion in obtaining participants consent for
interviews. As such, the snowballing technique acts as a buffer in managing the
excessive caution that may be exercised under normal circumstances.
The main limitation of this method is the likelihood of the results obtained being
regarded as biased and thus defeating the purpose of the research.

However, as

mentioned earlier, surveys are used to infer some characteristics which are expected to
be common in general. As such, though the results may not be totally unbiased and be
subject to some limitations, they are still believed to be reasonably satisfactory in at
least reflecting the general tendency of the key players in the industry (Patton,1990
pp.277-359).

3.3.4 Research ethics
Unlike the online questionnaire methodology where confidentiality was fully assured,
in the case of the interview method, the identity of the participant is known. In order to
abide by the principles of research ethics and not to cause any prejudice to the
participants of the face-to-face exchange on the subject, their anonymity is preserved
by using pseudonyms (Siedman, 1998, p.56).

3.4 Quantitative method
The online questionnaires, including the use of a print version in conjunction with the
interview methods in a number of cases, were both instruments of the qualitative
research methods. In the literature, however, qualitative research is often condemned
as being subjective due to its inherent limitations. For instance, theoretically speaking
random sampling is expected to ensure that the sample is representative of the general
population. For instance, purposive or convenience sampling is assumed to be prone to
partiality and the convenience of the researcher. As such the end results are thus not
truly treated as a very representative sample of the general population’s standpoint. In
order to neutralise this possibility in this study, some elementary statistical analysis is
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conducted to supplement and validate the results obtained from the qualitative
methods. Moreover, since one of the issues being analysed includes the value of
statistics in shipping, by comparing the results obtained from both the quantitative
(based on secondary sources of data) and qualitative method (based on primary sources
of data), it would be interesting to identify the gap, if any, in practice.
Yearly data were compiled from Drewry’s monthly publications. This included the
figures for newbuilding prices and second hand prices from 2002 to June 2009 for
containerships of 3,500 teu and from 1996 to June 2009 for Capesize vessels to reflect
the bulk market and Very Large Crude oil Carriers (VLCC) to be representative of the
tanker market. Data regarding the number of transactions in the newbuilding,
secondhand and demolition markets and size of fleet and order book on the supply side
for the dry bulk and tanker markets, were also extracted.
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Chapter 4 – Analysis

4.1 Data analysis and findings
From the reduced sample size (i.e. reduced by those that could not be delivered), the
survey yielded a total of 80 responses. Out of these, 56% were duly completed
questionnaires with valid responses.
The results of the analysis conducted by applying the methods described in the
previous chapter are initially presented separately. Feedback obtained from the
qualitative research method and those inferred from secondary data by applying
quantitative research methods are later combined to reach a reasonable conclusion.

4.2 On line questionnaire
Summary of results:
Questions addressed through the online questionnaire methodology were intended to
contribute to the literature on shipping and crises in general as well as drawing
additional input from experiences of competent shipping people in the industry. The
target group (as specified in chapter 3), were practitioners involved in the different
markets and market segments respectively.
Feedback obtained was helpful in providing a good insight into the shipping industry
and on how far theories attributed to the industry are actually dealt with in practice.
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The balance between the length of the questionnaire and response rate was seriously
considered as it is a common belief that the greater the length of the questionnaire, the
lower the response rate. In this context, the results of research conducted by Yu &
Cooper (1983, p.39) clearly showed a very weak relation between these two variables.
Moreover, the point of having 100% response to a short list of close ended questions
was not the primary objective of the research. A reasonable response rate but answers,
whereby respondents actually address the main concerns of the research, were the key
priority. In line with the mentioned objective, therefore, the 45 duly filled in
questionnaires were deemed sufficient.
(i) The first five preliminary questions were intended as a warm-up exercise to build
up the interest of the respondent. In addition, it also provided the background of the
respondent so that it allowed a more objective analysis of subsequent open-ended
questions. Answers to those questions, were, therefore, analysed ‘with a pinch of
salt’.
In reply to the first question regarding the length of experience in the shipping
industry, most of the respondents had more than 10 years of service. Given that
crises generally span a period of 7 years on average, having the greatest proportion
of respondents from the category of those who had more than 10 years of service in
the industry added value to the expected outcome of the survey.
The overall proportion of respondents, sub-divided in terms of their respective
length of experience in the shipping industry is illustrated in figure 3.
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Survey question 1
< 1 year
0%
1-5 years
18%

5-10 years
11%
>10 years
71%

Figure 3: Length of service of respondents’ in the shipping industry
Source: Questionnaire Survey Results

(ii) The second question looked into the shipping sector in which respondents were
involved. Interestingly, most of the respondents were employed in sectors of the
industry, other than the new building, sale & purchase and demolition market.
Figure 4 shows the employment distribution of the respondents in the industry with
respect to the specific shipping markets.
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Shipping Markets'
Employment Distribution

NEW
BUILDING

9%
S&P

15%
DEMOLITION

4%
OTHERS

72%

Figure 4: Employment distribution with respect to shipping markets
Source: Questionnaire Survey Results

The list of other sectors included respondents employed in commercial entities
such as chartering, ship brokering, marine insurance, port and shipping agencies,
container shipping operators to bank financing of shipping and offshore assets as
well as those who were part of the maritime safety and security areas of shipping
such as ship registration, maritime administration and definitely the maritime
training and education sector provided for professors at the World Maritime
University and its visiting professors.
From this result, it is also realised that in spite of the broad sub-division of the
shipping industry into four key markets, the influence and contribution of the
ancillary services providers to the smooth operations of those shipping markets are
invaluable.
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(iii) The main interest of the study in identifying the market segments respondents
were involved in was to support the analysis in responses of the three selected
market segments which were tanker, dry bulk and the container trade. The views of
the participants, who were fairly familiar with the sector, though they were not
directly employed in the selected three sectors, were also taken on board. This
variation was captured by the ´´other/s´´ category amounting to 30% as shown in
figure 5:
Shipping Markets Segments'
Distribution

TANKER

21%
OTHER/S

30%

DRY BULK

25%
LINER

24%

Figure 5: Employment distribution for specific shipping market segments
Source: Questionnaire Survey Results

In this category were the employees from offshore companies, ship registry,
academic staff, financing institutions as well as participants who were involved in
the selected sectors as well as sectors such as the LNG trade.
(iv) With regards to trading routes, while coverage of the liner trade was mostly on the
Asia-Europe and Trans-Atlantic routes, overall the liner market segment seemed to
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have a global coverage which included regional trade such as intra-Scandinavian
trade and US-Caribbean and the Indian Ocean. Similarly, for the dry bulk market
segment, the Asia-Europe and Trans-Atlantic route were its principal trading
routes.
On the other hand, the tanker trade seemed to have a global coverage. The key
reason behind looking at the shipping routes was to relate the type of market
segment to its particular trading routes and, subsequently, infer the economies most
likely to affect this segment or to be affected in case of crises in those segments.
For instance, tracing out the connection between the container trade and the US
market surely explains the vulnerability of the market segment to its trading zone.
(v) Generally, it is believed that loan financing is the most common financing option.
Analysing data obtained from primary sources, according to the results obtained, at
first seemed that although loan financing is more popular than investment in cash,
leasing and equity financing, there appears to be the possibility of another means of
financing being even more popular.
However, after closely reviewing the results of the questionnaire, it was found that
the ´´Other/s´´ option, amounting to 30% was in fact the same percentage (%) as
the proportion of participants who acknowledged being familiar with the key
market segments(as shown in figure 5). Since they are not directly involved in the
financial side of the business they preferred to abstain from commenting on the
means of investment. Thus, as portrayed in figure 6, although at first glance, it is
ambiguous, the last column was retained, simply to show the consistency in
response of participants (in relation to their background) and the data collected.
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Distribution of sources of finance
in shipping investment
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Other/s

Sources of finance in shipping investment

Figure 6: Distribution of sources of finance in shipping investment
Source: Questionnaire Survey Results

(vi) Questions 6 to 16 were theoretical queries on crises and shipping, based on the
respondents’ personal experience in the industry and their understanding of this
phenomenon. In reply to whether past crises had affected the organizations they
work for, 73% of the respondents were of the view that indeed they did have an
impact. The remaining 27% of negative replies were found to be from those
respondents who were either from the academic field or the sale and purchase
market. This outcome was reasonable given that it again accentuated consistency in
the results being analyzed.
(vii) In the survey, to differentiate between the two crises being examined, the
financial crisis was subsumed to be a consequence of financial institutions’
operational failures while the shipping crisis was considered equivalent to
consequences of volatility of freight rates. In comparing the impact of the financial
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crisis and shipping crisis independently of the industry, 42% of the respondents
believed that the financial crisis was more critical in influencing the shipping
industry’s performance while the rest of the participants were more concerned with
the effects of the shipping crisis.
In pursuing the discussion during the interview method as availed by opportunity, it
was understood that the distinction in opting for financial crisis and shipping crisis
was based on the time factor the respondent had in mind while answering the
question.

Those respondents who were considering the effect on the shipping

industry’s performance in the short term opted for the shipping crisis while those
respondents having a longer time horizon in mind chose the financial crisis.
The financial crisis, it was argued, not only affected both the demand and supply side
of shipping services, but its effects also stretch over a longer span of time. While a
squeeze in available liquidity in the market constrains demand in the commodity
market, demand for shipping services, given that it is a derived demand, is affected
proportionately. Similarly, supply of shipping services is restrained with limited
finance being offered for investment in new buildings. However, in the case of
freight rate volatility, the impact is visible as soon as the crisis happens in terms of
the spiral effect on charter rates and the value of vessels. Indeed the subsequent
frenzy among shipping stakeholders in terms of charter agreements not being
renewed upon expiry, renegotiations with bank institutions and greater likelihood of
bankruptcies of shipping companies(as cost recovery, in view of very low earnings in
terms of freight rates becomes difficult) are common repercussions.
(viii) The next two questions were an attempt to investigate how far shipping people
view the current global recession as being a bane (i.e. problem) or boon (i.e. blessing
in disguise) to the industry. Herewith, the ´´Likert scale´´ of measurement was used
to allow respondents to specify their level of agreement. As many as 69% of the
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respondents had no doubt that the current global crisis is a tragedy for the shipping
industry.
(ix) In answer to the nest question which enquires the extent to which the crisis was
perceived as being a ´´blessing in disguise`` to the industry, the response was
relatively evenly distributed between those who believed that it was definitely a
´´blessing in disguise`` and those who were certain that it was no blessing at all to the
industry.
During the interview session, upon enquiring, it was noted that the reasons for being
firm on the down side of the crisis were numerous and fairly obvious in terms of
vessels’ being laid up, cancellations of orders, bankruptcies and, above all, the loss of
trust and confidence in the market. On enquiring on the boon side of the argument,
the expected results were the ‘’cleansing’’ effect of the crisis in terms of the green
field shipyards that were spreading out very quickly, influx of non-shipping
speculators in the industry and the surge in paperless trade that were the outcome of
the boom that preceded.
In reality, the positive response emanated mostly from shipping people engaged on
the crewing and manning side of the industry. These participants were mainly
concerned with the manning crisis which was looming for the industry during the
boom phase. Apparently, it is believed that the current downturn is allowing the
shipping industry a grace period to take care of this dilemma, if the time is used
wisely, and provided that investment in training is not the first cost element to bear
the brunt of cost-cutting policies in shipping companies in the face of crises, as has
been witnessed during former crises.

(x)

Referring to the question of vulnerability of markets, separately, in the face of

financial crises and shipping crises, it was interesting to note that the demolition
market was viewed as being least affected in moments of crises. In the event of a
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financial crisis, 82% of the respondents were of the view that the new building
market was most vulnerable. It is indeed the most capital intensive area of shipping
as emphasised by Cushing (1991, p.2) in his doctoral thesis. As liquidity constraints
are felt by the industry, the propensity to invest in new buildings is reduced
considerably; significantly impacting the new building market.
On the other hand, in the case of a shipping crisis, it was observed that the vote by
respondents as to the vulnerability of new buildings and sale and purchase markets
was almost equivalent. This observation was reasonably in line with the theories of
ship investment. Indeed the financial constraints will freeze new orders until the
financial market recovers. However, freight rate volatility, as triggered by the
shipping crisis, first affects the second hand market. In the booming phase, given the
time lag between the placing of an order for a new ship to the actual delivery of the
vessel, the existing fleet’s value is appreciated considerably.
Consequently, as soon as charter rates collapse, the value of second hand vessels is
no longer as attractive so the ship owners’ market is suddenly turned into a
charterers’ market, whereby it is ships chasing cargo instead of cargo chasing ships.
Thus, along with new building orders being postponed, cancelled or renegotiated,
secondhand vessel values go down and carriage contracts are no longer renewed as
easily as before, upon expiry.
(xi) After analyzing the impact of the current global downturn on the individual
shipping markets, the next two questions of the survey were designed to look into the
implications on the selected shipping market segments, which were the tanker trade,
the dry bulk market and the liner business. In assessing the impact of the financial
crisis on those segments, 45% of the respondents selected the liner trade as being
most vulnerable. The reasons were based on the excess tonnage constantly
permeating the market and mainly with the nature of commodities commonly traded
through the liner services. Faced with financial constraints, demand for manufactured
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goods is among the first to take the hit as people will still need energy to survive and
raw materials for construction.
On the other hand, considering the impact of freight rate volatility on the chosen
shipping market segment, the tanker trade and the dry bulk market were perceived as
being most exposed. Unlike the container trade, in the tanker trade and the dry bulk
sector, the Worldscale and the Baltic Dry Index (BDI) are benchmarks’ used to
reflect the freight market demand at the time of fixture. Consequently, these two
segments are more sensitive to the volatility of freight rates as a result of the
transparency projected through the indexing system.
(xii) As elaborated in the literature review, some shipping experts believe that the
current global crisis is part of a typical shipping crisis while others believe that it is a
new phenomenon. In seeking the views of the available respondents on this issue,
67% of the respondents agreed that it is a new phenomenon that the industry is being
exposed to, while the remaining 33% believe it is no different from previous crises.
The reasons given to support the views of the 67% were globalization and the
revolution of information technology over the last few decades. With increased
globalization and liberalized trade, the inter-dependence of economies worldwide has
grown considerably so that happenings in one part of the world affect the rest of the
world by default through the domino effect, which was not the case in the crises of
the 1980’s, for instance.
In tracing the development of the ongoing global crisis, the suggested reasoning
appears valid as the source of the crisis is examined. The crisis started with the
bubble bursting in the sub-prime mortgage market in the United States, which was
transmitted to the financial institutions, as there were growing numbers of
foreclosures, and eventually the whole world economy, as a result of the
interconnections and interdependence between nations in global investments.
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(xiii) The next two questions were designed to infer the level of risk analysis applied
to investments in the selected market segments. Analyzing the reactions of the
differing market segments in response to the global crisis, (which considers both the
impact of the financial and shipping crisis combined, unlike the similar previous
questions), 48% of the respondents were of the view that the liner trade was the most
reactive while the tanker trade was the most proactive. The chaotic condition of the
liner market following the initial shocks of the crisis were deemed as being obvious
evidence of the no risk analysis system being in place. Similarly, the stability of the
tanker charter rates over a fairly long time following the shipping crisis in the
industry was gauged as being the result of the foresightedness of tanker owners.
(xiv) The subject matter of question 17 was on the usefulness of shipping statistics
published by reputed research organisations like Clarkson, Drewry, Fearnley and
Simpson Spence & Young Shipbrokers (SSYs). Investment decisions made by
management are usually made on the basis of future forecasts and shipping statistics
produced by these organizations, which are considered to be a good benchmark,
theoretically speaking. In this vein, the survey questionnaire was used to explore the
extent to which these publications are deemed as being useful tools in guiding a
management investment decision in practice.
The majority of the respondents, as reflected by the 57% response rate, indicated a
lukewarm appreciation of those publications by choosing the option ‘somewhat’.
According to this group of respondents, available data from these sources are good
records of past transactions in the industry. It is asserted that historical data are of
limited value in shipping. Most of the time, sincere attempts are made to forecast the
market, however, the reliance on those forecasts as rational investors should be
limited. They capture elements of the external business environment on which to
base their forecast of the industry and its subsidiary markets and market segments.
An investment decision in ships is mostly guided by in-house analysis and strategies
and objectives of the concerned investor or investing organization.
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(xv) ´´When the U.S stock market sneezes, the world economy catches cold!`` is a
popular adage investment theory. It emphasizes the influence of the U.S economy on
the global economy. As reflected by the subprime mortgage crisis, which started in
the USA and was eventually passed to financial institutions worldwide, the following
question in the survey questionnaire attempted to explore the possibility of similar
implications within the shipping industry. Based on the survey results, 38% of the
respondents were of the view that this theory also replicates itself in the shipping
industry.
The reasons to support this analogy were the size of the U.S market and the volume
of trade absorbed by this economy, which subsequently influences the supply and
demand of shipping services. However, the views of the other 38% who were not
totally in agreement with the validity of this theory in the shipping sector and
attributed greater weight to the imminent influence of the Chinese economy. They
were of the view that the USA may be the leader of the herd in the stock market, but
in shipping it is more and more the ´´China-effect`` that is more prominent.
(xvi) ´´The Dow Jones U.S Index is a broad-based but investable measure of the U.S.
stock market, intended for use as the basis of investment products.``
(http://www.djindexes.com/mdsidx/?event=showTotalMarket).
The main concern of the dissertation was issues guiding investment decisions in
ships. As a result, the use of the Dow-Jones U.S index as a benchmark in guiding
investment decisions in ships was investigated. The result obtained was quasinormally distributed. At the two extremes was the same proportion of people who
were convinced of the utility of this index in guiding investment decisions and those
respondents who had no doubts that this index was totally irrelevant in the context of
shipping. The remaining proportions of the respondents were neutral as the
likelihood of its utility in the context of shipping was deemed average.
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(xvii) As mentioned earlier, the remaining five questions of the survey questionnaire
were open-ended. After having sought the views of the respondents on different
levels ranging from the shipping industry in general, to individual shipping markets
and selected shipping market segment in relation to crises, the last questions were
designed to address ensuing risk management issues. Views of the respondents were
gathered on the basis of their experience and thus, their perceptions on risk related
themes such as ´´hedging`` and ´´freight derivatives``. Subsequent questions sought
the views of the respondents on the possible risk management strategies that need to
be considered in the likelihood of a reoccurrence of the current global crisis as well
as lessons that the shipping industry should retain following the initial impact of the
ongoing crisis.
(xviii) As a result of the nature of the questions asked, unlike the close ended
questions, it was not possible to express answers in percentage and highlight the
tendency of the general population on the key issues. In an attempt to codify the
answers to these open ended questions and produce inferences, which would be as
objective as possible within the inherent limitations of the methodology being
applied, the technique employed by Prof. Nakasawa (2000, p.41) was considered.
The process required the identification of words used repeatedly or their related
synonyms in explaining the key concepts (Appendix 2).

(xix)

For instance, in reply to the first open ended question, it was interesting to

note that in the shipping community, hedging is still being treated as being
synonymous to risk management among practitioners, as had already been observed
in a study by FreightMetrics in 2003. Similarly, freight derivatives was immediately
associated with the futures market in most instances.

(xx)

As for the query pertaining to the subject of plausible risk management

strategies in the aftermath of the turbulence in the financial and shipping markets
respectively, the views were varied and quite positive. The bottom line, however,
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remained uncontested. Given that shipping in general relies on the most basic laws of
global supply and demand, investment in ships thrives in this very environment of
uncertainty. Too many regulations or too much control will distort the risk-reward
element that makes investment in the industry so intriguing so that the interest of
shipping investors would dissipate as well. Being highly capital-intensive in nature,
this option would certainly not be in the interest of the industry in the longer run.

4.3 Interview method
As a sequence of the interview method, a print out of the online questionnaire was
circulated to a selected group of practitioners of the shipping industry. As stated in
chapter 3, this exercise allowed for the possibility of seeking further clarifications and
explanations on the key issues being addressed. The group of participants were
resource persons from shipping companies, shipping banks, regulatory bodies as well
as academic institutions.

Summary of results:
The gists of the discussions on the key issues are as follows:

(i)

Financial crisis & Shipping Crisis – how far can it be treated as reflecting
the chicken/ egg situation?

According to most respondents, it is believed that a general world financial market
affects international trade (world trade) which in turn affects shipping. Given this
direct relationship between these macro-economic variables, the shipping crisis
which followed was only to be expected. Regardless of whether this shipping crisis
was the consequence of the preceding financial crisis or the result of the nature of
demand of sea transport (i.e. derived from international trade), in the respondents’
opinions, it appears that finally it all boils down to ship finance. They stated that a
sound understanding of ship finance has never been more critical to surviving the
downturn in the shipping industry as in the recession of 2008-09.
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The other participants were of the view that the current shipping crisis is not part of
the industry’s normal cycle. It was forced on the industry by virtue of the banking
crisis. They had strong beliefs that had the financial crisis not occurred, the shipping
industry would have had a longer boom phase and the impact on the industry would
not have been as overwhelming. It is true that after a boom phase, a recessionary
period usually follows. Thus, as shipping practitioners, realistically they were
anticipating the boom would soon come to an end. However, the pace at which the
cycle changed its direction, and the extent to which it actually ended up affecting the
industry, were very much unanticipated.

(ii)

Variation in responses of individual shipping markets and selected shipping
market segments explained

The responses on the differing impact on the shipping market segment were based on
the nature of the commodity traded. As observed earlier, the container trades are
focussed on manufactured goods/finished products; the dry bulk sector caters for raw
materials and the tanker trades energy. Therefore, as the financial crisis pervaded the
shipping industry, the initial shocks affected mostly the demand for manufactured
goods so that the container market was expected to take the first hit. However, this
time, surprisingly it was the dry bulk market which crashed overnight. It was not
because the demand for investment projects fell rapidly but rather the bursting of the
over-optimism that had inflated freight rates and prices of dry bulkers to highly
artificial levels which were not sustainable, as had been the case with the sub-prime
mortgage crisis which developed in the United States in 2007 and 2008.
The tanker industry was perceived as being the most proactive in general. Is this
really a fact or the result of sheer coincidence? It is true the tanker industry had
experienced the price of over-optimism during the disastrous crisis of the 1980’s.
Yet, whether the sustainability of its market freight rate in spite of the adverse market
situation was the result of lessons learnt from the past is certainly not very clear-cut.
Instead, the stable market conditions of this segment were believed to be more the
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consequence of the long term contracts which are usually concluded for carriage of
energy resources and the international regulations requiring the scrapping of single
hull tankers within the allowed time schedule. The stringent operational requirements
for tankers also act as a significant barrier to the entry of new investors. According to
a few participants, the fluctuations in oil prices also influence the demand for tankers
and are thus, also assumed to have been instrumental in explaining the lag
experienced by this segment to actually feel the impact of the crisis.

(iii)

Usefulness of shipping statistics in aiding investment decisions in shipping

Views on the usefulness of shipping statistics in guiding investment decisions in
ships were diverse. For a certain group of shipping people, they were undoubtedly a
valuable tool in guiding investment decisions in shipping. They reflect the
development of the market and as such they provide a relevant benchmark which,
supplemented with an investor’s individual perception of the market and his/her risk
appetite, enhances the value of investment decisions made in ships.
On the other hand, some shipping people were convinced that historical data are
simply for the record and to better understand what has already happened. They are,
therefore, of very limited value in aiding investment decisions in ships for the future.
They argued that due to the time lag which is faced from compilation of the data to
their actual publication and eventual distribution, the value of the information has
already diminished. Over time, new elements are introduced so that reliance on these
statistics should be guarded.
Others were neutral on the use of shipping statistics as a basis for investment
decisions, giving that for them a good insight into the prevailing market conditions,
the extent of freight rate volatility and prospects for the future, coupled with the
experience of the key participants and good in-house data analysis, are more practical
tools in guiding investment decisions in ships than sheer speculation.
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(iv)

How far is government intervention desirable in shipping?

Governments are elected by the general population of particular nations. In this
context, the sound intentions of governments’ attempts to support their domestic
industries were not disputed. In general, the macro-economic objectives of
government are conflicting. In moments of crisis, they become more sensitive.
Actions taken at the local level to contain the impact of crises may easily be
construed as perpetuating protectionism at the international level.
This is often the dilemma of the shipbuilding sector in shipping. In the initial stage,
yards may still survive as a result of the orders placed earlier on but gradually, as
cancellations of new building orders and the renegotiation of deliveries build up, the
plight of shipyards makes them vulnerable. In countries like China and South Korea,
the losses faced by this sector, be it financially or at a socio-economic level, have
been tremendous. Ironically, therefore, even though financial assistance to this sector
would only add to the existing problem of excess tonnage of the shipping industry,
the respective Governments were forced to extend their financial support.
However, it was also asserted that shipping in general can do better without or rather
with limited government intervention during the normal course of business. In case
they are compelled to intervene, as under the present tumultuous conditions, it should
only be done following serious consultation with the industry.

(v)

Risk management strategies for the future

In spite of most shipping markets being affected by the global recession, there was
general consensus on the fact that diversification is a good risk management strategy.
For the past few years, based on the portfolio theory, there have been increasing
tendencies towards diversification in shipping investment. More and more shipping
companies have been widening the base of their operations by investing in several
market segments instead of specialising in one particular segment. For instance,
presently companies who had diversified their business operations are expected to be
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in better shape than companies specialised in a particular segment. As demand for
manufactured products, cars for instance, fell drastically the company could still
offset its losses incurred in this segment by the relatively more steady earnings from
its tanker trade, unlike the pure car carrier companies, which had ´´all their eggs in
one basket``. Moreover, the change in USA’s saving pattern, protectionism and
effects on financial regulations are also expected to influence existing risk
management strategies.
As any investment activities in shipping, diversification is also costly. As a result,
over time, new financial instruments such as ´´hedging`` and ´´freight derivatives``
have been introduced to meet the highly capital intensive needs of the shipping
industry. It was interesting to observe that hedging is treated as being synonymous
to risk management by most shipping practitioners.
Opinions on freight derivatives were divided. Some shipping practitioners were of
the view that the use of freight derivatives is doing more harm to the industry than
good. The use of freight derivatives, it was stated, was driving the industry from its
primary goal of providing a service and instead more towards ´´gambling´´ activities.
Proponents of freight derivatives argued that although, during the present shipping
crisis, the use of freight derivatives may not have shown results, it was not the
instrument which was flawed, instead it was the users who blindly invested in those
instruments without realising the entailing implications who were at fault. As a
result, proponents of the freight derivatives market strongly believed that the
effective use of these tools requires specialised human resources and a sound
knowledge of the market.

4.4 Statistical analysis
Based on the inherent limitation often associated with the questionnaire method, the
conclusion that may be drawn is that answers to the selected research questions are
quite subjective. The way they are answered reflects the position the respondent might
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be operating at. For instance, as noted through the interview approach, while brokers
are fairly confident with the use of Forward Freight Agreements (FFAs) as a hedging
tool, the traditional ship owners see them as a serious threat to the ‘real fundamentals’
of the shipping industry, as they believed was shown by the current crisis.
To rationalize the results obtained from the online questionnaire and interview
methodology, an elementary statistical analysis exercise was attempted to correlate the
results obtained in practice by using data published by Drewry.
The theory postulated by sea transport economics identifies freight revenue as the main
source of cash for shipping companies. Over time, it has been established that this
wave of cash flow connecting the shipping markets is in fact the main driver of
shipping market cycles. Subsequent relationships were also documented between the
specific shipping markets (Stopford, 2009).
A strong correlation was noted between freight rate fluctuations and the ensuing
pattern followed by the second-hand prices of vessels. Similarly, the relationship
between new buildings and second hand vessels prices is closely connected. As freight
rates get higher, the values of second hand vessels against new buildings appreciate
continuously and their prices build up until they reach a point where the gap between
the values of new buildings against the second hand vessels’ price is no longer
significant and, therefore, investment in the new buildings stand out as a more viable
option. In fact, in 2007-2008, the second hand prices of modern dry bulkers were well
above new building prices (even though new building prices had also risen).
The response of shipping markets in the three selected market segments (i.e. container
ships, dry bulkers and tankers) following the analysis of data compiled from Drewry is
presented below.
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(a) Container ships’ market segment
Investment in ships start with the orders placed for new buildings. In this vein, an
overview of changes in the worldwide position of shipyards in general would be
sensible. While in the 1970’s European countries and Japan were the major
shipbuilding nations, South Korea became the number one shipbuilder nation in 2002.
In 2004, with the growth of the Chinese economy gaining momentum, China had
announced that it intended to be the world’s biggest shipbuilding nation by 2015
(Smith et al., 2008, pp.68; Stopford, May 2004).
Referring to the container market segment, five years later, based on available data as
at 31 July 2009, as shown in figure 7, overall, although South Korea had maintained its
position as the number one containership builder, it is being very closely followed by
the China.
Share of major containership builders
as at 31 July 2009

Others
19%

China
36%

South Korea
40%

Japan
5%

Figure 7: Market Share of major containership builders as at 31 July 2009
Source: Graphical illustration based on data published by Drewry
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Defying the common belief that the ongoing recession would affect the positioning of
shipyards and simply allow the survival of the fittest, the Chinese and South Korean
governments are extending tremendous support to their respective shipbuilding
industries. Assuming that these domestic policies would be effective, it seems that the
Chinese containerships builders would most probably be the world’s biggest
shipbuilding nation by 2015 as promised; especially given that presently they are
already leading the container shipbuilding for vessels of a size less than 3,000 twenty
foot equivalent units (teu).
Analyzing the data for containerships from 2001 to 30 June 2009, it was observed that
the theoretical relationship postulated between the second hand value of vessels (10years old) and new buildings’ prices was maintained as illustrated in Figure 8.

Container Ships : Annual average NBL & SH prices
(2002-2009*)
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Figure 8: Container Ships: Annual average NBL, SH Prices & TC rates
Source: Graphical illustration based on data published in Drewry Shipping Insight
Note: (*) denotes that information for year 2009 is up to 30 June 2009.
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2009*

Statistically, this hypothesis was established by finding the correlation between the two
variables.

Correlation is a statistical measure which describes the degree of

relationship between two variables and is denoted by ´´r``.
The correlation coefficient between the new building and second hand prices for the
container market is close to 1, which denotes a highly positive correlation. The results
are summarized in table 1, as follows:

Table 1: Correlation between NBL, SH prices & T/C rates for Containerships
Correlation

P-value,

(2002-2009*),
i.e.Sample size,
N=8

Conclusion
Since p<0.05,

NBL & SH
Prices

r

r2

Hypotheses

Given, N=8 and
Degrees of freedom,
(N-2) = 6

0.93

0.86

H0 : r = 0

p = 0.0004

Reject H0

H1: r>0
SH prices
& TC rates

0.66

0.43

H0 : r = 0

p = 0.0375

Since p<0.05,
Reject H0

H1: r>0
Source: Statistical analysis based on data published by Drewry
Note: (*) denotes that information for year 2009 is up to 30 June 2009.

In table 1, the null hypothesis denoted by H0 presumes that there is no relation at all
between the two variables under consideration, namely the prices of new and
secondhand ships. The alternative hypothesis, denoted by H1, is based on the common
belief that there is a strong prior theory to suggest that the relationship between new
building and second hand ship prices would be positive.
However, in theory a high correlation might also be the result of chance. In order to
determine the probability of the result being highly positive by chance, a one-tailed test
at the common significance level of 5% is used. For the test conducted, the p-value
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confirms that the odds of the correlation being a chance occurrence are less than 5 out
of 100 (as shown in table 1).
Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected here, H0: r = 0 which states that there is no
correlation between the two variables and concludes that the alternative hypothesis,
H1: r>0 is true and therefore the high correlation between the new building and second
hand prices of containerships is statistically significant.
A positive correlation was noted between charter rates of the vessels and their second
hand values as well; however, they were not as strongly correlated. This may be
explained by the oligopolistic nature of the container market as mentioned in earlier
chapters. Freight rates are not wholly influenced by the market forces of demand and
supply but instead at the discretion of the liner companies, based on their
competitiveness and efficient management of their internal resources. As a result, its
influence on the sale and purchase market is relatively less than assumed in other
market segments, which are more likely to operate under free market conditions.
In parallel, relating the feedback from respondents on the Dow Jones index to
investment in containerships, it is believed that unlike the BDI for the dry bulk market
and Worldscale for tankers, it is inadequate as an indicative measure of the market. A
more reliable proxy would be the movement of empty containers where the effect of
underlying changes is felt as soon as consumers’ purchasing power takes a hit. As such
it is expected to be a more reasonable decision support parameter for investors in
containerships.
So far, as a rule, the competitiveness of major containership builders and the trend of
their new building and second hand values, respectively, are deemed to be the key
factors which determine the size of the order book for such vessels as illustrated in
figure 9.
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Size of order book in the
container market segment
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Figure 9: Containerships Order book
Source: Graphical illustration based on data published by Drewry
Note: (*) denotes that information for year 2009 is up to 30 June 2009.

The order book of containerships is visibly on the high side for the year 2009, as may
be observed from figure 9, which would certainly make the already bad conditions of
the container trade market worse, as new tonnage would be continuously added to the
already excess supply of tonnage.
Yet, another unique aspect of the shipping industry seems to be the ability to find
opportunity in every difficulty. This tendency is visible in the eagerness of ship
management companies like Wilhelmsen Ships Service in launching its new service for
either the hot or cold lay-up of vessels and GAC Ship Lay-Up Solutions (GLUS)
offered by GAC among others, in seizing the prevailing market conditions to create
new business opportunities and be actively engaged in the provision of lay-up
packages.
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Another observation from the survey conducted and the face-to-face exchange with
shipping practitioners concerned the responsiveness of the container market to the level
of consumption of manufactured goods. Apparently, in the context of the current crisis,
the chaotic condition of the container trades was assumed to be a result of the squeeze
in purchasing power. As such, the percentage (%) in world GDP growth was assumed
to be a good proxy to measure the correlation between purchasing power and the
demand for services of container vessels measured by the change in the size of the
container fleet.
In figure 10, the close relationship between sea trade and world GDP is obvious.

Figure 10 : Evolution of World GDP & Sea trade: 1966-2006
Source: Stopford, M. (2008, p.97). Maritime Economics. Routledge.

A similar result was expected to relate the rate of growth in GDP and demand for
container services. Data available to measure the change in fleet size of container
vessels was limited from July 2005 to June 2009. Assuming that a time lag is
experienced for the change in GDP growth to transfer to higher demand for consumer
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goods, a time lag of six months was assumed. As such, the annual change in fleet size
was based on an average, based on the financial year principle.
Table 2 : Comparison of World GDP & Containership fleet size growth rate
Year
2007
2008
2009*

Annual change in GDP
growth
5%
2.9 %
-1.5%

Annual change in fleet
size
6.87%
9.13%
9.44%

Source: Statistical analysis based on data published by Drewry
Note: (*) denotes that information for year 2009 is up to 30 June 2009.

From the summarised data presented in table 2, a negative correlation of 0.82 is
obtained between the two variables. Based on empirical evidence there is a strong
correlation between GDP and container growth (Bossche, May 2009; Kuch et al, 2008,
p.22). The author further elaborates that if GDP growth declines by 1%, container
growth falls by 10% or more. In this light, there are two ways of explaining the strong
yet negative correlation between these two variables.
At first, intuitively, the difference in the direction of the correlation may be assumed to
reflect the uniqueness of the crisis 2008-9. This is obviously a relatively weak
supposition. A more logical explanation is that as GDP growth increased by 5% in
2007, the increase in fleet size was experienced two years later, which is captured by
the 9.44% increase in fleet size in 2009.
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(b)

Dry bulk
Share of major dry bulker builders
as at 31 July 2009

Others
9%
China
47%
South Korea
23%

Japan
21%

Figure 11: Market share of major dry bulk (Capesize) builders’ as at 31 July 2009
Source: Graphical illustration based on data published by Drewry

According to data extracted from the Drewry publication as at 31 July 2009 and as
shown by figure 11, China is the leader in the dry bulk shipbuilders’ market segment.
Following the tough competition that the South Korean shipyards are facing in
container shipbuilding and its dominant position in the dry bulk market segment, China
seems to be advancing tactically as promised to be the world’s biggest shipbuilding
nation by 2015.
Data for the dry bulk segment were available from the year 1996 to 30 June 2009.
Using the available data, firstly the trend of the shipping crisis in this sector is
considered for the period 1996 to 2007, as shown in figure 12.
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Dry bulk carriers : Annual average NBL & SH prices
(1996-2007)
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Figure 12: Dry bulk carriers: Annual average NBL, SH prices & TC rates (1996 -2007)
Source: Graphical illustration based on data published by Drewry

Obviously based on the trend being followed, especially the sharp rise in all three
variables, namely, the annual average new building and second hand prices, as well as
the time charter rates from 2006 to 2007, gave no firm indication at all of the crisis
looming for the shipping industry. Yet, as shown in figure 13, which includes what
actually happened from 2008 to mid-2009, should it be concluded that indeed shipping
statistics have limited predictive value and are primarily records of historical data, as
alleged by most respondents?

53

Dry bulk carriers : Annual average NBL & SH prices
(1996-2009*)
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Figure 13: Dry bulk carriers: Annual average NBL, SH prices & TC rates (1996-2009)
Source: Graphical illustration based on data published by Drewry
Note: (*) denotes that information for year 2009 is up to 30 June 2009.

To further explore the predictive value of available shipping statistics, instead of the
yearly average, the monthly average was taken from the years 2006 to 2007, which
was taken as shown in the figure 14.
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Dry bulk carriers : Monthly NBL, SH prices & TC rates
(2006-2007)
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Figure 14 : Dry bulk carriers: Monthly average NBL, SH prices & TC rates (2006-2007)
Source: Graphical illustration based on data published by Drewry

Based on the graphical presentations shown by figures 13 and 14, whilst focusing on
data from only two years (i.e. 2006-7), the differences in the inference that may be
drawn are fairly obvious.
While the annual average smoothes out the real fluctuations in ship values and time
charter rates, keeping abreast of the monthly fluctuations of the key variables provides
a more realistic understanding of the tendency of the market.
Therefore, as far as the utility of shipping statistics in guiding investment decisions is
concerned, it may be concluded that the value of statistics as a decision support is
dependent on the users’ ability in further data-mining and the analysis of the published
data.
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Unfortunately, it seems, as succinctly pointed out by Andrew Lang, the general
tendency of the industry is to ´´use statistics as a drunken man uses a lamp post – for
support rather than for illumination``.
As far as the relationship between new building and second hand (10-years old) values
of Capesize vessels operating in the dry bulk sector is concerned, as observed in the
earlier analysis of the container market segment, they are also in conformity with the
basic theory on shipping freight volatility and subsequent shipping cycles. The strong
correlation between new building prices and the prices of second hand vessels is also
replicated in the case of Capesize vessels in the dry bulk sector.
Nevertheless, compared with the container ships market segment, the correlation
between freight rate volatility and the second hand value of Capesize vessels were
more strongly correlated as illustrated in figure 15.
Dry bulk carriers : Monthly NBL, SH prices & TC rates
(2006-2009*)
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Figure 15: Dry bulk carriers: Monthly average NBL, SH prices & TC rates (2006-2009)
Source: Graphical illustration based on data published by Drewry
Note: (*) denotes that information for year 2009 is up to 31 July 2009.
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This may be explained by the free market conditions that are exercised in the dry bulk
market as compared to the container trade. The use of the BDI in providing the
benchmark for daily fixtures on the spot market allows greater flexibility to the market
forces of demand and supply to determine the established freight rate, unlike in the
liner business.
In parallel, shipping being influenced by factors related to the broader economy, the
demand for dry bulk was being driven by the massive demand for iron ore and coal by
China in preparation for the Olympics held in August 2008. From figure 15, the
´´China-effect`` is visible as from July 2008 when the country started limiting the
production work of its factories in order to control pollution prior to the Olympics of
2008, a decline which continued after the Olympics. The combined effect of the
reduction of demand from China for dry bulk cargo and the loss of confidence in the
financial markets explains the subsequent steep fall in value of the Capesize vessels, as
well as their time charter rates.
For the dry bulk segment, another interesting set of data extracted from the Drewry
Shipping Insight was the level of transactions expressed in thousand deadweight tons
(’000 dwt) for new buildings, second hand vessels, as well as the demolition of dry
bulkers. Undoubtedly, bearing in mind the linkage established between shipping
markets and financing investments in the industry, the level of transactions in the new
buildings, second hand and demolition markets is a good indicator of the health of the
financial market and its likely implications in the shipping industry.
For the sake of consistency, the summary data for the level of transactions is also
considered as from 2006, as shown in the table 3.
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Table 3: Dry bulk carriers: Annual Transactions (´000 dwt)
Transactions (’000 dwt) – Annual data
Year

New orders
Total

%

SH sales

Demolition
%

Total

Change

%

Total

Change

Change

2006

35,156

-

37,429

-

1,690

-

2007

134,614

283%

50,266

34%

374

(78)%

2008

78,964

(41)%

24,050

(52)%

4,046

982%

Source: Tabulation based on data published by Drewry

Results from the table in terms of annual percentage (%) changes clearly show the
inverse relationship between the level of new orders and in the demolition transactions.
The most evident outcome was the change in the level of transactions for demolition,
which increased by 982% from 2007 to 2008. This was a very strong indication of the
crisis that was affecting the shipping industry by end of the year 2008.
For deeper analysis, a similar month-to-month analysis was made of the transaction
level for new orders, second hand sales and demolition from January 2008 to June
2009 as seen in table 4. Data for the second half of 2008 shows an almost 50% decline
in new building transactions from July 2008 to August 2008. New building
transactions for the same months in 2008 as compared to the results in 2009 have
declined quite significantly.

In view of the excess tonnage that the industry is

presently facing, this is a fairly good signal. Second hand sales seem to have increased.
This may be explained by the actual or threatened foreclosures that ship owners with
limited cash reserves, face and the relatively young fleet changing hands at relatively
low prices in favour of stronger players.
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Table 4: Dry bulk carriers: Annual Transactions (´000 dwt)
Transactions (´000 dwt) – Monthly data
New orders

Month

2008

2009

SH sales
%

2008

2009

Change

Demolition
%

2008

2009

Change

%
Change

Jan

14099

358

(97)%

1523

2520

65%

0

2485

-

Feb

6301

233

(96)%

1169

2898

148%

0

1501

*

Mar

7625

0

(100)%

3269

2833

(13)%

0

1093

*

Apr

5890

0

(100)%

2324

3319

43%

0

851

*

May

11301

1220

(89)%

3407

5805

70%

0

1246

*

June

4804

1600

(67)%

2382

4790

101%

0

269

*

July

10756

**

**

3102

**

**

0

**

**

Aug

6214

**

**

1696

**

**

48

**

**

Sept

5340

**

**

1932

**

**

0

**

**

Oct

4057

**

**

822

**

**

581

**

**

Nov

1814

**

**

1411

**

**

2075

**

**

Dec

764

**

**

1014

**

**

1341

**

**

Source: Tabulation based on data published by Drewry
* denotes undefined as zero is not divisible by any number, except itself
** denotes the second half of year 2009

Given that in the first few months of 2008 the market was still trading at its peak of the
shipping cycle, the transaction level for demolition was naught. Nonetheless, in 2009,
the change was quite significant, especially in January 2009. This reflects the older
vessels which had long surpassed their useful economic lives but were still making
good business during the boom phase. As the market crashed, the costs of maintaining
those vessels were too high so that demolition was the most reasonable option. It may
be deduced in general that the market seems to be self regulating.
However, over the months, instead of increasing, the levels of demolition transactions,
as calculated in the last column seem to be almost constantly declining. In the 1990’s
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even ´´good offers from breakers were not sufficient to tempt`` owners into scrapping
their older tonnage (Drewry, 1996, p.29). According to McConville (1999, p.71), this
is the consequence of the price of scrap which usually replicates the movement of the
freight market. In the present conditions, this may be explained more in terms of the
speculation of ship owners in anticipation that the dry bulk market would recover from
the crisis sooner rather than later. Yet glancing at the order book for Capesize vessels,
it seems that the market might probably take a longer time to recover.

Dry bulk orderbook - Capesize
as at 31 July 2009

No of Capesize vessels on order

300
250
200
150
100
50
0
2009*

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Year of delivery

Figure 16: Dry bulk carriers: Order book
Source: Graphical illustration based on data published by Drewry
Note: (*) denotes that information for year 2009 is up to 30 June 2009.

Although 2009 may end on a more positive note than 2008, the influx of new buildings
expected in 2010 is most likely to aggravate the dry bulk freight rate volatility for
Capesize vessels further, as excess tonnage is expected to increase considerably, unless
a significant portion of the 2010 deliveries can be delayed to 2011-12 by renegotiation.
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(c) Tanker
As shown in figure 17, as in the containership supply, the South Korean shipyards also
have a dominant position in the tanker segment.

Market share of tanker builders
as at 31 July 2009

Others
11%

China
25
%

South Korea
44%
Japan
20%

Figure 17: Market share of major tanker builders as at 31 July 2009
Source: Graphical illustration based on data published by Drewry

Figure 18 illustrates the evolution of annual average new buildings and the second
hand prices of tankers and time charter rates for the period 1996 to June 2009.
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Tankers : Annual average NBL, SH prices &TC rates
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Year
NBL prices
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Figure 18 : Annual average evolution of NBL, SH prices & T/C rates
Source: Graphical illustration based on data published by Drewry

The graphical illustration clearly shows the close correlation between the three
variables as it did in the containership and dry bulk market segments. Indeed, the
correlation between the new building and second hand prices of tankers and between
second hand prices of vessels and charter rates are very strong.
In fact, for the tanker segment, whereby the sub segment for VLCC was considered,
the correlation between both new building and secondhand prices and that of second
hand prices against the time charter rates average, stood out to be highest across all
market segments, with r = 0.95 and correlation coefficient r2 amounting to 0.91.
With the phasing out of single hull tankers, the demolition market transactions have
been continuously on the high side, the more so in the half yearly period of 2009 as the
time for phasing out all single hull tankers becomes imminent. In spite of the combined
effect of the financial and shipping crisis which started in 2008, the tanker market
segment was in a relatively secure position throughout the year.
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It is in 2009 that some surprising results have been projected. For instance, the new
building transaction level for the half yearly period 2009 was 0.2% of the total
transactions for the year 2008 while the transactions for second hand vessels was
reduced by 95% in comparison to the level of transactions negotiated in 2008, as may
be observed in the table 5.
Table 5: Tankers: Annual Transactions (´000 dwt)
Transactions (Total ‘000 dwt)
Year
2008
2009*
% Change

New Order
55225
125
(99.8)%

SH Sales
28312
1163
(96)%

Demolition
3600
270
(92.5)%

Source: Graphical illustration based on data published by Drewry
Note: (*) denotes that information for year 2009 is up to 30 June 2009.

Although, as shown in figure 19, the investment activities in the tanker market segment
have been fairly buoyant over the years, the future stability of the tanker market would
be significantly influenced by the expected deliveries of new tankers in the coming
years.
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Transactions levels ('000 dwt)

Level of Transactions ('000 dwt)
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0

Year

New order

SH sales

Demolition

Figure 19: Tankers: NBL, SH and Demolition total transaction levels
Source: Graphical illustration based on data published by Drewry

Looking at the trend established so far with regards to new building orders, the initial
increase in new deliveries as from 2009 to 2011 may be explained by the investment
made in double hull tankers to replace the single hull ones being phased out in 2010
and the time lag taken for the building of new ships. This market condition is clearly
reflected in figure 20.
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Tanker orderbook - Vlcc
as at 31 July 2009
70

No of Vlcc's on order
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Year of delivery
Figure 20: Tanker Order book – VLCC
Source: Graphical illustration based on data published by Drewry

As shown through the changes in the size order book over the years, as from 2012, the
growth of the market segment seems more controlled; which emits a positive signal as
to the stability of the tanker charter rates in future.
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Chapter 5 - Discussions and conclusions
5.1 Discussion
The financial crisis 2008-09 was as unanticipated as was the timing and depth of the
shipping crisis. In Shakespearean language ´´what’s done cannot be undone``.
Nonetheless, these disturbances have created a number of challenges as well as
opportunities for the shipping industry as in investment in ships, which the industry
cannot deny. The industry’s vulnerability to these adverse economic conditions have
forced entrepreneurs to take stock of their existing resources, review their
management strategies/investment decisions, touch base with the fundamentals of the
industry’s key characteristics, including basic management requisites for survival;
once again by continuously monitoring their commercial entities’ state of being visà-vis their internal as well as external business environment.
As stated by one of the respondents during the survey, conservatism is believed to be
the best risk management strategy of any shipping investor. Others believe too much
conservatism will dissipate the ´´fun`` of being in the shipping business. These
diverging views clearly highlight the differing degree of risk appetite of the
respective shipping persons; the former being risk averse while the latter seeming to
be more of a risk taker. As a result, the eventual risk management strategies by these
individuals will also differ at the corporate level. Yet, the lesson learnt from the
present economic downturn for shipping companies is that, irrespective of the way
they diversify their investment portfolio to minimise the risks, maintaining a good
cash reserve is a must. Although the portfolio theory curtails the possibility of total
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loss by spreading risks between assets which are negatively correlated, it did not
show the expected promising results during the current crisis as pointed out by
Harkey (2009, April), as a result of certain limitations (Buffet, 2009). Evidently, this
is possibly one of the main reasons which explain the new trend towards cash flow
hedging as one of the main risk management strategies being pursued by companies.
Hedging, an investment instrument borrowed from the financial sector which aims to
set the limits of risk, has gained momentum in the shipping industry as freight
derivatives. It was conceived to downplay the element of risk and uncertainty which
prevails in the industry. As fervently asserted by most shipping practitioners during
the survey, it is obvious that no risk management tool is self-sufficient or effective by
default. Their effectiveness lies in the way they are used and the extent to which
they are understood by their users. A similar argument was rightfully put forward by
Gillian Tett, assistant editor of the Financial Times, during her defence of the JP
Morgan’s pioneering invention in the 1990’s in the form of the credit default swap in
her publication entitled ´´ Fool’s Gold``. Hedging, the use of freight derivatives,
options and now cash flow hedging are also sophisticated tools used supposedly to
control the level of risk. Nevertheless, at times it seems it is only the use of these
tools which ends up being uncontrollable or misguided.
In this light, it is believed that the effectiveness of these tools in bringing about the
desired results themselves maybe requires some measure of control, possibly through
a regulatory body to set certain standards instead of leaving it all to the traditional
´´gentlemen’s agreement´´ being practised so far.

The proposal of having a

regulatory body is not to reduce the so-called fun of being in the shipping business,
but instead simply to ensure that the players in the industry are cushioned against
similar occurrences and not left ´´ in tears`` later as asserted by one of the
respondents. Therefore, hedging cash flow may be a very promising strategy for the
future, provided its users are fully aware of the agreement they are getting into.
Indeed, whether looking at the current crisis or former crises, there have always been
winners and losers. Irrespectively, therefore, all crises have an element of bane or
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boon in-built. So, in attempting to answer whether the current crisis is a bane or boon
for the shipping community, it seems it all depends on which line of the industry the
principals are involved in. For instance, while shipping banks and speculators are
expected to qualify it as a bane, it is more likely to be seen as a boon by the
traditional players of the shipping industry and proponents of environmental
ideologies like Siddiqi who had in his study assessed the indirect benefits the Asian
Crisis had entailed for environmental issues in the 1990’s (Siddiqi, 2000, pp 1-7).
Another group who ended up perceiving the current downturn as a boon were the
practitioners involved in the crewing aspects of the industry and investors in shipping
related infrastructure.
For instance, port infrastructure projects typically have a long lead time, and if there
is no “strategic” plan by governments as well as commercial operators to provide
facilities for future growth and these projects are simply put on hold due to an
economic downturn, then, when the eventual upturn happens, we may return quickly
to periods of congestion and hence inefficiency. Similarly, if the result of the global
crisis is a surplus of seafarers (or at least removing the shortage) so that investment
in recruitment and training will cease as a cost saving measure, it is more likely that
the shipping industry will be laying the foundation for the next shipping crisis.
With the crisis that hit the industry, it was the ship owners who had placed orders
when the market was on the high side and had secured the required financing from
banks who were most vulnerable. With the significant slash in earnings and prospect
of secured future charter contracts, debt servicing was a real challenge for them.
Shipping banks, which relied on the valuation of brokers, provided prior to the crisis,
had to seek new valuations which in the aftermath of the crisis were much more
difficult to obtain and required shipping investors to bring in additional collateral
security or risk foreclosure. Similarly, valuation in shipping, as in other businesses, is
no easy task. This has been vividly portrayed by the experience in the dry bulk
sector, which nose-dived overnight leaving shipping investors, ship yards and
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shipping banks in a fix. Unlike most assets which depreciate more evenly over their
useful economic life until they are written off, in the shipping industry the
accounting people have to continuously review their revaluation theories as far as
ships are concerned. The next question which crops up is based on what?
Another issue which has generated great concern is the reliability of shipping
statistics which are normally updated regularly by the reputed brokering and
publication houses.

As noted during the statistical data analysis part, statistics

published by external sources are compilations of historical facts and review the past
market developments. The usefulness of these data is determined by the interest and
in-house data analysis and interpretation of the shipping investors. Statistics offer
only a snapshot of the general situation of the industry at a given point in time. Their
utility as a decision support relies on the resources and experience of the shipping
investors in coming up with an appropriate in house tailor-made model to support the
investment strategies as there is ´´ no one size fits all`` model in the industry.
Shifting from corporate policies to national policies, as presented in earlier chapters,
the support extended by some governments to their domestic shipyards were
condemned by the industry in general. The current crisis is said to be a global
problem so that solutions being envisaged should also be for the welfare of all. In
reality, in spite of the international nature of shipping, it is felt that international
policies may not be as easily implemented. The implications of these policies in
terms of socio-economic issues at domestic levels are too high to be disregarded. In
fact, doing so may generate another vicious circle of investment with the in-built
multiplier effect which is more likely to prolong, rather than cure, the current crisis.
Loss of employment implies loss of income, lower income generated implies lower
spending which is reflected in lower investment, lower investment will obviously
lead to lower demand for shipping services and therefore, adding more to the crisis.
On the other hand, government support to the shipyards ensures continued
employment and related income-multiplier effects which would restore the stability
in the market in the longer run. Instead of looking at the short-term solution, re-
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adjusting the focus on the longer-term solution would allow shipping investors to
adopt better investment and related risk management strategies for the future.
It is true the shipping business and in particular investment in ships, is risky. Yet,
risk has never prevented new players from joining the industry. Over time,
globalisation has not only diversified the portfolio of investors, but instead, it has
also diversified the breed of investors as well as financing institutions and means of
financing. This was all done with a view of managing risk. So, risk management is
most certainly in the DNA of shipping practitioners, which keeps being innovated as
the industry expands. In the beginning, risk management was the conservatism of
traditional ship owners who were mostly private entities, but later changed to being
publicly listed companies. Financing institutions were shipping banks, which were
over time being challenged by new financiers under the guise of KG schemes and
similar institutions. Similarly, means of financing shipping investment started off
with private resources, followed by more and more debt financing to the more
sophisticated financial instruments, which are now expected to be increasingly
dominated by cash flow hedging due to of the financial crisis 2008-09.
5.2. Conclusion
As a concluding note it is recognised that each crisis exposes the vulnerability of
existing systems and brings in innovative ways of dealing with the challenges
pervading the industry as it evolves.

Whenever crises strike, weaknesses are

unveiled and a blame culture scenario is sketched to identify the main causes of the
crises. Eventually, as the fittest players survive, new risk management strategies are
created to guide investment decisions in ships. Assuming the blow of this global
recession has been hard enough to safeguard us against similar occurrences, the
effectiveness of these strategies would be indisputable. Unfortunately, based on the
long history of crises in the shipping industry, it is clear that in general, humans by
nature have a decreasing memory of the past. As such the same mistakes are most
likely to be repeated and similar crises may follow. It is a merry-go-round which may
never end.
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Appendix 2 Questionnaire results - Answers to open-ended questions 20-24
Answers to open-ended question 20

20. As a shipping person, what does the term ``hedging`` mean to you?
1

attempting to limit current risk/exposure

2

reduce volatility of cash flows

3

the ability to offset risk

4

I am not very familiar with this term

5

Diversify

6

Not much

7

Take a chance

8

shielding oneself from risks

9

?

10

Its means '' linking a function with another to be better able to determine how the
original function changes as the varialbles do change.",These are the variable whose
degree of change determine how much freight can change with time."

11

The best way to understand hedging is to think of it as insurance. When people decide to
hedge, they are insuring themselves against a negative event. This doesn't prevent a
negative event from happening, but if it does happen and you're properly hedged, the
impact of the event is reduced. So, hedging occurs almost everywhere not just in
shipping, and we see it everyday. For example, if you buy house insurance, you are
hedging yourself against fires, break-ins or other unforeseen disasters, or say you decide
to build a double hull tanker back then when it was yet to come to force by legislation,
you are hedging continued business especially with the oil majors.

12

No comment

13

To protect your cash investements from currency fluctuations.

14

Do not use it

15

Analysing and accommodating business risks
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16

TRANSFER OF RISK IN A BUYING - SELLING TRANSACTION.

17

Guarding against volatility in freight or commodity price fluctuation.
Hedging

18

is

contract

to

maintain

freight

for

certain

period.

See FFA on dry bulk = Forward Freight Agreement: it is a position taken on the state of
the dry bulk timecharter market at specified future date

19

It is kind of risk aversion by insuring in advance against a negative event.

20

Putting measures in place with the anticipation for any future decline in the shipping
business, so that these measures could help boast back the downturn. In shipping this
could be in the form of fonds, sales of old vessels, order of new vessels and host of others.

21

providing more than one risk support such as insurance to cover loses

22

not applicable to my work

23

not sure have been out of the shipping profession for a while

24

technique designed to reduce risk

25

no knowledge about it

26

GBP to US dollar hedging, fuel hedging

27

It’s a tool for mitigating risks arising out of market volatility.
Innovation

28
29

offsetting risk

30

It means securing future shipping service or freight at current price or level.

31

covering all bases

32

It is an investment made to reduce the risk of adverse movements of the shipping market
by taking the opposite position of the initial exposure

33

speculate price movement (freight) and take proactive action to avoid/limit loss

34

minimising risk

35

finance tool

36

securing a future position by a financial instrument

37

no comment
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38

spread risk

39

means managing your risk, mitigating interest/freight rate risk

40

means that ship business inherently incurs risks

41

protection against volatility of markets by transferring risk to other venturers

42

insurance in commercial transactions, offsetting of operations of the physical market

43

investing in FFA's, swaps, options in order to cover your physical exposure in the market

44

risk mitigation - not all eggs in one basket

45

covering potential losses by buying into the futures market

Answers to open-ended question 21

21. As a shipping person, what does the term ``freight derivatives`` mean to
you?
1

a 'paper' market which allows users to try and hedge their physical
positions

2

secure forward starting charter rates

3

a financial tool used either to hedge or to speculate on the future
movement of freight markets

4

Freight derivatives as projected by Baltic Index and others would
help in developing understanding on how the freight market is
behaving.

5

N/A

6

Not much

7

The fluctuation of freight rates.

8

freight elements

9

?

10

The industry should use a proactive strategy of risk management
which entails a holistic approach towards managing risk.
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A freight derivative is a financial contract between two parties, which
sets an agreed future price for carrying commodities at sea. The
contract does not involve any actual freight or any actual ships. It is
purely a financial agreement. Given the current volatility of the freight
markets, managing freight market risk is a significant issue for the
shipping industry. One method of managing this risk is through the
purchase and sale of forward freight agreements (â€œFFAsâ€ ).
11
FFAs are for me also Freight derivatives. Derivatives are risk
management tools, the value of which is derived from the value of an
underlying asset. In the shipping industry, the underlying asset is the
freight rate for a specific physical trade route which receives a daily
assessment on say the Baltic Exchange. Two types of FFA's I know
are Swaps" and "over the counter" trades which am sure you are
also familiar with."
12

no comment

13

Factors in product supply-demand that influence freight.

14

Do not use it

15

Not used

16

AGREEMENT BETWEEN TO PARTIES THAT DETERMINE A FUTURE
FREIGHT RATE TO BE USED ON A SPECIFIC SHIPMENT.

17

Advance prediction of freight

18

used either as a hedge or for speculation"

19

Financial instrument for future trading of freight rates for large cargo
through bulk carriers or tankers etc and the future freight rates are
published in Baltic Exchange. Frieght derivates is also kind of
advance insurance against negative shipping market

20

Comparing the spot rate with previous market rates.

21

Contract or arrangement that determines freight rate for a specified
period.

22

not applicable to my work

23

not sure either

24

financial instrument for trading in future levels of freight rates

25

no knowledge about it

26

na
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27

Freight derivative is a tool for hedging the risks from volatile freight
markets. However, it can work in the very short term and is not very
valuable in very high volatile market situations such as the current
one. Additionally, speculators have entered the freight derivatives
market thereby making it rather meaningless.

28

to offset risk

29

a means of offsetting risk

30

charges associated with freight

31

not much

32

They are financial products derived from the underlying freight
market that are used to hedge or speculate

33

A tool for hedging

34

instrument to secure eranings for future

35

financial instrument include FFA

36

an instrument which can be used to hedge against freight
fluctuations

37

no comment

38

limit fluctuation

39

if used correctly, it is valuable financial tool

40

risk management as a buyer/as a seller, gamble

41

no comment

42

futures, options, freight financial products used for freight hedging
operations e.g. futures (FFA market on the Baltic Exchange, IMAREX

43

investing in FFA's, swaps, options in order to cover your physical
exposure in the market

44

paper hedging ''instrument'' to mitigate chartering ups + downs

45

Freight rates fixed for ''delivery'' in future markets
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Answers to open-ended question 22
22. In light of the present global crisis, assuming the likelihood of its re-occurence be
high, based on your knowledge and experience of the shipping industry, what kind of
risk management stategies do you believe, will be effective in safeguarding the
shipping industry against its subsequent shocks?

1

Shipping relies on the most basic laws of global supply and demand so it is quite
difficult to put truly effective risk management in place. Risk allows for profit to be
maximised but at same time can also leave Owners open to loss if they misjudge the
market.

2

Increase equity and general strengthening of balance sheet, i.e. lock in longer-term
financing.

3

The present (and future) global crises are based on greed and an inability to
learn/remember the lessons of history. Risk manaagement strategies can only mitigate
these basic human failings but not eliminate them.

4

In depth study on type ships in a particular sector including on order before making
any commitments and taking on long term charters

5

Supply and demand of tonnage.

6

No.

7

Very low risk

8

to plan well the needed tonnage in the industry

9

Cost control / cost avoidance

10

The industry should learn to depend more on the economics statistics of the world and
if investing it should expect the returns after a much longer period than it has always
been.

11

As you also indicated, hedging is one and use of freight derivatives. Old fashionly, I
would still go for pro-active compliance to legislation and to what the customer" or
charterer requires protecting the company especially in the tanker industry. "

12

- Keep up the fleet in a good shape, complied with Rules and Regulations, ready to be
operated
- Focus on training to personnel and retaining them as a long term investment

13

Modest cash investments (2nd hand market 07-11 years old), pooling of ship
deployment and discarding overage tonnage.
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14

It depends of the duration of the crisis. However, you will need to look at marketing
strategies, competitors, rates, deb financing (if) or alternative options, credit risk
assessment, and possible gather with other members of the shipping industry to draw
strategies as well.

15

Less virtual economics, more real transactions.

16

SLOWER GROWTH RATE, FOCUS ON PROFITABILITY RATHER THAN MARKET
SHARE.

17

To be present in all shipping segments i.e to say liner, tanker, bulk carrier, LNG, LPG,
Chemical etc. and also distributing ships into long term and short term charters at the
same time.

18
19

I cant give any answer as I do not keep track of the shipping market and the risk
managment

20

I believe in contingency planning, what ever situation we have at that time, even during
booms and negative booms because what ever the case there will be some downturn
but what matters is how you manage it with the resources available.

21

strategic planning in selection of markets, rates and determine the effective hedges to
contain shocks in the industry

22

producing quality and serious seafarers taking advantage of the crisis

23

Perseverance

24

Companies should reduce the volume of newbuidings so as to reduce the global
supply in ships and increase the freight prices in the future.

25

no knowledge about it

26

strict cost control

27

Must secure certain amount of freight i.e. 60-70% through long term contracts and
hedge only a small percentage through the spot trade.

28

Buy tonnage, With fuel efficiency, new technology in order to sale freight cheaper and
establishing a win to win business with the owners of cargo and establish a more
person to person attention to their clients.

29

I do not agree that the likelihood of its re-occurrence is high however each company is
individual and they will all make different judgments about the market; some will be
right and others wrong - that seems unlikely to change - ever.

30

proactive and forecast based risk management strategy
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31

diversify-operate different types of ships and services

32

Fix vessels with long term, period charter with first class charterers, reduce leverage,
increase capitalization, avoid long chain of sub charterers

33

optimal fleet size (tonnage) & keeping strong reserve; balance fleet(type & class) &
limit exposure to speculation

34

risk management analysts

35

As banker, we are more strict in giving loan

36

Balancing fixed term and long term charters. Sufficient liquidity coupled with secured
funding for long term commitments

37

no comment

38

hedging on cash flows

39

Shipyards are too subject to too much political issues -different drivers with different
agenda; banks are not regulators of the industry, they are answerable not to the
industry but to their shareholders. They are committed to make money and make
money sensibly!

40

to maintain ''good friends'', ''good customers'', ''good partners’’ shipping is really
volatile ''please review what YOU & bank did in past 3-4 years'' - review of decision
making

41

diversification into other sectors, e.g. service, offshore etc

42

no comment

43

investing in FFA's, swaps, options in order to cover your physical exposure in the
market but more liquidity needed; better forecasting esp. in macroeconomic factors

44

a similar crisis may be protected from but there will be no protection from different
crises

45

FFA's and investing in ships
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Answers to open-ended question 23
23. Based on your experience, what are the lessons the shipping industry should learn
after the initial shocks of the present global crisis?

1

we have seen similar problems previously when euphoria colours vision and high
prices accompanied by high freight rates encourage too much speculative investment
which leads to over supply. When this is combined with the collapse of the financial
markets and credit lines are halted it can only have one result. Unfortunately the adage
'history repeats itself but we never learn from history' seems to apply all too obviously

2

Same as after previous shipping crisis. The order book has grown to big, too optimistic
forecasts about future demand and charter rates.

3

People should look at long-term historical trends and not short-term market spikes.
this should hold people back from over-ordering tonnage, paying unsustainably high
prices or over-extending debt commitments

4

We need to develop better growth and development strategies so that the expansion in
shipping is in phase with the growth in trade

5

To keep a closer eye on the global practice of credit loans and the value of cash
reserves.

6

None

7

Try to have a better view of the needs of the customers, how much cargo that has to be
transported around the world.

8

shipping industry is heavily dependent on global trade

9

Not to invest too heavily during major high periods - the cyclic nature of the industry
needs to be accommodated in planning for the future.

10

This questionnaire should not only be directed to Shipping Experts but also to
Financial Analysts. The Econometrists of our times did not use the right variables so
they could not estimate the extend to which the world economy can be affected by the
financial crisis

11

Nothing beats being prepared. Doing your risk assessment and continually reviewing
AND responding positively to what you yourself have risks assessed helps to ward off
any (bad) surprises coming out of the business cycle.

12

no comment
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13

Astute Risk Management Policies

14

no comment

15

Any business is volatile, shipping even more. Be prepared for internal competition; but
also, pray that external factors do not coincide with your lean times.

16

NOT TO OVER EXTEND THEMSELVES.

17

To be present in all shipping segments and also distribute risks into short term and
long term charters.

18

no comment

19

After a storm there is a lull, utilize the energy to capitalize on the lull otherwise the
markets will keep thinking that there is going to be another storm.

20

The world economy has many derivatives and these should be constantly monitored,
since we know shipping is a derived demand" any change in one sector of the
economy be it fuel prices or production of raw materials or changes in the price of the
finish goods

21

Think and act strategically to contain the shocks.

22

Should have predicted such crisis on the basis of past experiences and to be ready for
taking initial shocks.

23

diversification

24

Persistent booming in freight rates is followed by a sharp reduction

25

no knowledge about it

26

to be always aware of cost control even during the good times

27

To resist from the heard mentality of acquiring tonnages profusely and focus only on
niche newer markets. Also to try to secure a significant part of the tonnages in longterm steady cash flows.

28

The business has to be more alert to the economic indicators Such as combustible,
iron and technology prices and it has to tray to establish a balance between demand
and freight.

29

to keep looking at the fundamentals

30

To be proactive and should be ready for unexpected downturns.

31

not to get carried away during the boom time so much so that there are tears during
crisis time
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32

Beware of finance since shipping market through FFAs and public listed company
became very sensitive to finance. Also could be of interests to create a system of
netting of physical market, prohibit speculation with FFAs that are increasing freight
volatility

33

optimal fleet size (tonnage) & keeping strong reserve; balance fleet(type & class) & limit
exposure to speculation

34

managing risk & uncertainty

35

If BDI go up very much, we should ask you one question: why? And we should be
careful. In this kind of situation, do not hurry for buying new ships

36

The financial markets are much more important today than in the past

37

no comment

38

my understanding is for them, it is more ''business as usual''

39

to stick very much to historical rates as there are no perfect solution by virtue of the
cyclical nature of the industry's evolution

40
41

long term contracts, diversification into less volatile sectors

42

Controlling the number of newbuilding ships, transparency of demolition market, new
regulation for FFA market at Baltic Exchange

43

Always remember shipping cycles, history repeats itself!

44

very few lessons can be learnt from capitalism

45

not expect good markets to last, plan for ''rainy day'', save $$ in good times
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Answers to open-ended question 24
24. Any other feedback, comment or views you wish to share on the subject, please.

1

This is the first downturn in which the money market collapsed at same time as
commodity prices and global freight rates and so no alternative avenue was avlbl which
offered any respite from the effects of worldwide recession. Presently it is safe to say
that 'cash is king' and so owners can expect to try and take advantage of other Owners
or institutions which find themselves under pressure.

2

---

3

no

4

Shipping is cyclic and this happens every few years.

5

Although the credit crunch has eased the demand for ship officers, without proper
planning the problem will return as the markets pick up. Also, there is evidence that
training budgets have been cut, and this will have an adverse affect if not addressed.

6

None

7

Would be good to have a no opinion - don't know" option in the questions. "

8

The shipping industry, especially container shipping is really hit than ever before

9
10

No
---

11

You need to also consider Safety, Environmental protection and Health compliance
issues as well as Integrity and good business reputation as just as important as the
financial strategies you adopt in this business.
To be viable, a shipping company should consider of the following:
- safety compliance

12
- training
- good leader with long term vision/strategy

13

Good old fashioned Greek Philosophies: 1- Let the ship earn to fund the fleet, one X
one. 2- Constantly innovate to keep operational costs low, 3- Separate operational costs
for that of safety.
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It will be important to assess the general world economy situation at beginning of 2010
and also shipping sector lost.

14

Many small companies will need to close down. Meanwhile other companies are laying
up more ships and loosing profit. The big shipping companies will reduce rates in order
to struggle filling the containers and gather the clients of the small companies that did
not survive.

15

Wish you success with the Dissertation

16

NO

17

Will be happy to clarify any doubts, if I can. Thank You.

18

---

19

Nothing, All the best, Sorry I could not comment much about it Regards

20

Or maybe natural causes as we know will affect the shipping business. Whether we like
it or not."

21

Care ought to be taken in assessing the impact of the global financial crisis on the
shipping industry as the full results cannot be ascertain at this stage.

22

no. wish you best of luck

23

none

24

no

25

no

26

a lot of ship owners started to benchmark their costs and cost control is widely
introduced through in ship man companies

27

Shipping industry continues to be guided by so called experts and do not rely on their
respective exposures with their direct customers. There is a need for focusing on the
customers and building long term relationships rather than drawing blood at short term
opportunities. Shipping is immediately affected by world trade and various movers in
the world trade; hence it should hedge its risks on study of various world trade
indicators. It should also consider in vertical integration by getting stakes in mines, oil
fields etc to secure cargoes.

28

Good luck with your research
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29

This survey completely ignores the influential role of the broker and it would have been
useful to gather data on that. Also your questions do not allow for the not applicable"
answer as in Q5 above; we do not invest in ships as we are brokers. "

30

It is an interesting research. Hope it will contribute to the knowledge on the industry.

31

Diversification has proved the best for our company at least. While some types of ships
lost, other types made up part of the losses

32

---

33

---

34

Shipping is international,…with globalization any crisis in this industry will have
worldwide repercussions, as such it a must for all to be duly concerns with issues
relating to this industry!

35

---

36

---

37

---

38

---

39

---

40

It would be interesting to understand what banks think about what they did

41

---

42

Uneven number of the fleet in certain segments, control after ship-building
industry(there should be more stringent regulation on loans, credits available from the
shipbuilders), no green-field shipyards

43

---

44

---

45

strength of fleet or cargoes could out-ride hiccups, SME's will suffer unless they are
flexible and open to change
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Appendix 3 Transcript of Interviews

(i)

Interview 1

Date: Friday, 12 June 2009
Respondent: John (pseudonym)
Particulars:
Written Questionnaire Answers - 10 minutes
Questionnaire-based interview - 20 minutes approx. (18 minutes 58 seconds)
1 Financial crisis or shipping crisis-which is worse?
Q1: Like, in one of the question I ask about ... which one is worse for the shipping
industry, is it the financial ?,... i.e. is it the financial crisis or shipping crisis which is
more problematic for the shipping industry or the shipping crisis?... and you chose
the shipping crisis. Why did you choose shipping crisis instead of the financial
crisis?
Answer: Because the freight volatility is more likely to affect future freight rate or
current freight rate than whatever is happening in financial institutions. I think it is
more relevant to the shipping market specifically.

Q2: why I am asking this question is.. .because, when I was doing the literature
review, they that say it is finance which drives the shipping market?
Respondent: ump,…

Q2 (contd): They believe that if there is more the incentive to borrow money, then
there are more people who go to invest in ship...
Answer: You used the word I was going to mention which is investment. If you are
looking at the overall shipping investment market, I would certainly say that the
financial crisis was more relevant but you mention the shipping market or shipping
crisis ... and there is more to shipping than just buying and selling goods, there is
more to shipping than just investing in ships,..shipping is mostly carrying cargo on
ships, not just buying ships and using ships as commodity ,...that’s why I mention...,
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if you talk about the new building and sale and purchase market, then I will agree
with you - financial crisis, but you talk about the shipping industry in broad that’s
not just investment in ships

2 Shipping statistics – Usefulness & reliability questioned?
Q3: ...and another thing is,..One of the other question...we have all this up to date
statistics coming everyday and of course many shipping companies based their
investment decisions on those statistics, but...ump, why is it that still so many
companies faced problems during this crisis
Answer: Because they ignored the statistics!... or they did not understand them well!
Or they did not create them...

Q 3 (Contd): So...
Answer (contd): you are talking about Drewry and Clarkson I believe...
Q 3 (Contd): yeah, yeah,and...
Answer (contd): It is the people who create those statistics; I believe, they believe –
know what they are doing! But people who don’t ...perhaps read them for what they
are\do not understand them- either ignore them or use them wrongly!

3 Shipping Market Segments
Q 4: and ...For different market segments, like... when the crisis happen, for the dry
bulk it was a steep fall down while for the tanker it was quite resistant for a while...
and for the container trade it was very static,...how do you explain this situation?
Answer: The dry bulk market was mostly led by the iron ore and coal market, both
of which were and still are of great importance to the steel industry and the biggest
country for importing iron ore and coal of course is China and China had a very
large proportion of the iron ore from the world for the last five years, about one third
of the world’s iron ore and about a quarter of the world’s coal was going to china and
with the downturn in need for steel partly, because of the number of ships being built
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has reduced; the orders for ships was being reduced there is less need for
steel...China could therefore

control

the world steel market and effectively

therefore, world trade by September 07 last year,..Therefore they stop buying iron
ore, therefore they stop buying huge volume of coal, or rather they stop buying iron
ore at cheap rate from Brazil and they started buying only from Australia and that
had a quite knock-on effect

Q4 (Contd): but for the tanker market,...because it is energy that the world,...
Answer(Contd): it is less likely that the liquid energy market will be affected quite as
dramatically ...because people are still going to need crude oil, and products such as
fuel, diesel and all the others jet oil and all,..so that is less likely to change as
dramatically, it has taken a hit but not quite as huge and not quite as sudden as with
the dry bulk market which was mostly led or downfall was mostly led by china and
regarding iron ore & coal in particular

Q4 (Contd): but for the container trade how do you explain this static reaction,...
Answer (Contd): That is because the majority of the consumer goods carried in
containers will still be sold...people are still going to buy clothes and shoes and
laptop computers and TV sets and food .Processed goods and so forth, that kind of
market or rather the downturn on the overall spending money of the public is that
they not going to stop buying everything right away... that is more steady
Q4 (Contd): can we say that the effect on market segment is led economically by
economic needs and again it turns to finance issue
Answer (Contd): ump, ya, ya good ...ya, now for example it is a better time to
borrow money
Q4 (Contd): because of the low
Answer (Contd): because of the low interest, ya
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4 Ship Finance
Q5: and what about...like banks are becoming more strict in lending money to
shipping companies, it is not so easy to invest and when low investment it tends to
generate negative cycle eventually in the long run
Answer: Then, it could do, I should say I do not know that banks are now reluctant to
lend money,..now is a great time for them to lend money at least from an owners’
point of view, I grant you from the banks point of view that banks are not earning
much interest that is not very good for the bank but I have not heard that the banks
are having such a terrible time
Answer (Contd): …You believe they are?

Q 5(Contd):Yeah,...
Answer(Contd): as regards lending money?

Q 5(Contd):...to the shipping industry especially,..Because of the shipping cycle
which is so volatile, when it was at high, so many owners borrowed money to buy
ships at this high price and now suddenly they are unable to pay back the money
Answer (Contd) : Do you find from what you read ...‘foreclosure’ ...where ships are
being bought back by banks when owners cannot pay,...ump ...and what do bank then
do with those ships?

Q 5(Contd): they just sell it again?
Answer (Contd): well some do indeed,...others they might still,...and... Do they sell
it?

Q 5(Contd): yeah...
Answer (Contd) : they do?...yeah sometimes they sell,...but most banks will let them
be managed by ship management companies and in my experience several of the big
ship management companies which is doing lot of work on behalf of banks,..
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Q 6: and also many people keep mentioning or keep highlighting that this financial
crisis is very different from previous crises, do you also believe that it is different
from previous crises we had had?
Answer: It is definitely bigger, more wide-ranging. It is different because it started in
a different way and it is likely to last for a fair time but not for as long as was
expected last year when we were told that this crisis will last at least until mid 2010
but now we are beginning to see, at least on the freight rate side an upturn ... and we
are now in June 2009, …so yes, it is different in that sense,..ya!

5 Government Interventions
Q 7: And also it is said that in the shipping industry because of the reoccurrences of
these cycles, ..We are so used to these cycles, so it is normal, so do we let the market
works its way out or should we take measures to make the market become good
again?
Answer: what kind of measures?

Q 7(Contd) : like the governments are taking in supporting financial institutions or
ship yards by providing credit or…
Answer: Well, if the government can afford to provide credit, that’s a big question
and they have more than enough to do as it is now… if they can, yes that will be
useful,…Otherwise, let the market play with itself and it will resolve its own issues.

Q 7(Contd) : Because the conflicting issue here is that we have this oversupply which
we have to take care if to make the market become normal again but if the
governments are taking initiative to correct this supposedly market failure by
providing more credit to shipyards, so they are still adding to this oversupply,. And
not really helping,. Are they?
Answer: Yes, exactly,..On the other hand, they cannot ignore shipyard
unemployment which is the biggest – because you cannot simply close down a
shipyard, suddenly you have 3,000 people on the street – so you got to keep the
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shipyard going,. I will come back to what I said before, ..the market should probably
correct itself,.. I do not think government interference would be useful; it may be
misplaced!

Q 8 : According to you, given the socio-economic effect in the short run, it is ok for
government to interfere?
Answer: It might be, depending on how they interfere! If they are interfering for the
sake of it to win votes, without thinking through, what is it that they are doing OR
how useful their investing would be, I think, that is not very clever,.. there is the need
for better dialogue between banks, government and the industry – as I suspect there
is not much dialogue that has gone before or directives from high like ‘’ this is what
we think you need’’, rather than ‘’ what do you need?’’

6 Financial crisis & Shipping Crisis – Is it depicting the chicken egg situation?
Q 9: when we had this financial crisis and soon after we had this shipping crisis, a
big question was whether it is the financial crisis which led to the shipping crisis or
was the shipping crisis already working its way through and it is the financial crisis
which was actually the last nail in the coffin, as they say,…
Answer: No, I do not believe it was the last nail in the coffin and that shipping
market was going down already,..
On the contrary, the shipping market was going to thrive, especially after the last
four years of unexpected huge profits… so the financial crisis affected the overall
shipping industry,..At least in the carrying of cargo!

Q 10: But when shipping industry was booming so abnormally in a way, we had so
many speculators, e.g. the green shipyards as they are called which came in the
market,. So do you not think that in a way this crisis had kind of ‘’clean up’’ these
practices,..
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Answer: clean them out you mean? ummh, ..In that sense that’s true but I do not
think I will rely on the financial crisis to do your cleaning up…that would be too
drastic!

Q 10 (contd): But still the media talk about it, they tend to put much emphasis on the
crisis being so,..
Answer: Mostly because the media does not know what they are doing and bad news
sell newspapers and television programs and good news tend not to sell newspapers.
So, if you have some media, some journalist who are really good and understand
from their research, much of which are however headline grabbing and most of them
do not know what they are actually doing and therefore what the public see is what
the newspaper say and which is not necessarily the book story!

Q 10 (contd): So, in your opinion, if the financial crisis was not to happen, the
shipping industry would have continued booming?
Answer: Yes, there was still a huge demand and there is still a huge demand for
major commodities and therefore, ships to carry them, which is why shipyards had
full order books until 2011!

7 Boon or Bane?
Q 11: So, for you the financial crisis is nothing to the shipping industry..not a boon
neither a bane?
Answer: I would not say ´´ nothing``,..Just that it is not the driving force.
Q 11 (contd): So, for you, it is not affecting shipping in a very significant way not
like,..
Answer: Yeah, not like in the case of housing, for instance,...because some people
are still going to need cargo that are regular1 95 % of everything that we wear, that
we sit in, that we sit on, that we sit under,..that we use, are carried by sea - and that’s
not going to stop- it may not be as before but it is not going to stop!!!
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8 Globalisation & IT
Q 12: Also one of the questions that arose was…When the previous crises e.g. in the
1990’s in the eastern part of the world,… because globalisation was not so
widespread at that time, the effect was not as global as it is this time and moreover
we also had It which was not so very accessible to all- but today, with the
information power that is around, why is it that the info was not pass on as quickly
so that these bad repercussions which happened could have been prevented,.. In your
opinion?
Answer: umh, I think it was pass on very quickly in the world as compared to the
early 1990’s and I would say that people did react as quickly, ..I would say the more
so than in the more ignorant days of the 15-18 years ago. I am not sure, I quite agree
with your question,… In fact they are plenty of players who were able to react quite
quickly because of the speed of information transfer!

9 Risk management strategies
Q 13: And what about risk management strategies that shipping companies adopt or
already have adopted? Do you think it is a common practice in shipping companies
to have such formal risk management strategies?
Answer: Yes, yes, ..Especially the larger players do

Q 13 (contd): And is it a formal kind of risk management strategy?
Answer: Usually, yes, the larger players do,.. You know what they do with respect to
investment activities, for instance,--they consult banks, buy expertise; quite big
business on the employment market especially

Environmental issues v/s Oversupply?
Q 14: And for the scrapping market? What about the situation following the financial
crisis…it was zero sometime back, because of the booming market and now suddenly
it is full- and still we have all these environmental regulations – so that this problem
of oversupply remain more or les stagnant.
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Answer: Do not forget now,..We have to write down a number of ships – especially
tankers by next year all the single hull tankers would all be completely scrapped –
those e.g. that will not be converted into carrying dry bulk cargo, those single hull
tanker will be scrapped and that will have certain influence on the wet market supply

10 Any other input, comments or suggestions:
Q15: Any other input, comments or suggestions:
Answer: politics should play a lesser role and /or if play a role, it should be with
serious consultation with the industry rather than dictating – i.e. communicate more!

Q15 (contd): So you think, politics should be away from shipping except if they are
in good consultation with key stakeholders,..Then what about International
Institutions like IMO; ICS,..What about their role? Should they interfere or not?
Answer: I think they should interfere when it comes to crisis of their magnitude. The
IMO mostly concerned with safety and technical aspects. ICS, ICS, Intertanko,
Intercargo, Baltic exchange, BIMCO,..All these major institutions are involved in
looking at the larger overview of the market

Q15 (contd): So this is something that the market need as a regulatory framework
you mean?
Answer: yes, absolutely,. I would say so. Otherwise shipping people would be
wondering where the next need is, where the next suggested move is. So, yes, they
look to these institutions.
Q’: Thank you
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(ii)

Interview 2

Date: Monday 29 June 2009
Respondent: Mr Job
Particulars:
Written Questionnaire answers - 10 minutes
Questionnaire based interview - 26 minutes approx.
1. Shipping & crises
Q1: Based on your experience, what do you think about crises & shipping (in
general), suppose we do not consider the present one?
Answer: previous crises?,..am too young one for this ;)?…so,.uumh, I have no first
hand experience but I heard from people that have experiences that they were not as
bad as they turned out now,…especially because they were crises pushed by the
shipping industry and not financial institutes, i.e. banks were in good state but it was
fundamentally demand for especially tanker that fell apart; leaving many ship owners
exposed, …ships are normally needed
Q2: Suppose we talk about shipping cycles and business cycles in general? What do
you think about the relationship between shipping cycles and business cycles in
general? Is there any connection?
Answer: Is there any correlation between shipping cycles and business cycles you
mean … I think it depends on the market. I think shipping always lags behind. The
thing …I would say that they lag behind the shipping cycle. So I guess the one that
reacts most to finance, for instance, the business cycles, for instance new demand
increase which might happen in one year or two years time is going to be in the Liner
sector and bulk carriers may be…they are not that much correlated, or that they are
correlated to the lag in business cycles so shipping always need to react to the
broader economics.

2. Shipping Market Segments
Q3: When you speak about shipping market segments? How do you explain the
differences in reactions between the different market segments? Like for instance in
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current crisis the sudden crash of the dry bulk rates, the tanker charter rates being
quite stable,..
Answer: Bulk carriers was primarily based on China’s tremendous demand for raw
materials and in connection with freight derivatives, especially, FFA’s in the capsize
sector - rates went up to US 20,000 dollars/day. So, I think, the demand by China
and the hope that people put into the demand of China that it will continue to grow
for certain period of which led to those tremendous increase in freight rates and time
charter rates and containers was equally based on China,… I think shipping in
general, with maybe the exception of the tanker market was very much based on
China and the demand the China was hoped to generate, which I think was one of the
stupid idea, was what led to those too high rates!
Tanker, I would say, tanker did not touch high level, they were quite stable and as
you can see they the last to be affected by the crisis. Maybe it is poor argument but
again, it may be explained in terms of container and dry bulk markets based on China
and ships traded.

3. Ship finance
Q4: And according to you, how does it affect investment in vessels in those segments
now?
Answer: now? …From owners’ perspective, if you are newcomer in the business,
you are more or less incapable/ or not able to tap the bank loan market at all! I think
only if you have good banking relationship or you have done lots of deal with your
house bank if they have faith in you and if you can pay those rates, loans may be
sanctioned based on percentage on top of the LIBOR, but if you are a new company,
for example in dry bulk, say, you might rather consider generating equity or use junk
bonds to raise finance!
If you look at the KG scheme in Germany at dry bulk and container market,…for
individual companies, if you are not a traditional ship owner, with some
conservatism and a good past like say that the company had survived the crises of the
80’s and 90’s , then I think it really tough to get finance!

108

4. Shipping Statistics
Q5: If we look at shipping statistics, then, how far can we say that they have been
useful; should have been helpful or could have been helpful?
Answer: If you look at Martin Stopford or big brokering houses in general, they all
have a research department. But nobody really forecasted what was supposed to
happen. You can argue that as a broker, you are really needed between the fronts,
you have to help your owners, you have to be helpful to your charterers or the
shipyards; so I would say there was a lack of research in forecasting the future and
investors kept ordering vessels as they forecasted that China would continue to grow
was definitely was not very smart

5. Government Intervention
Q6. Then, we have government intervention which is taking place? What do you
think about government Intervention in the shipping industry?
Answer: I think it is a different form of protectionism/economic nationalism, which
from a country point of view fully understandable as you try to keep your domestic
industry working and your citizens in job but from macroeconomics view I think it is
very dangerous as it does not cure the problem but instead states by supporting
shipyards, they are instead delaying the curing of market as much as government do
not see the whole picture but only their country.
Q6 (Contd): So you mean to say that government actions taken at local level for
other industries should not be the same for shipping because of its global nature of
the business?
Answer: Ya, Shipping by nature, is probably most international business you can be
in.. Whatever happens to China affects everyone in shipping all over the world,.
therefore, one should have a very globalised view of the industry, especially as a
government….especially, I think as the crisis has shown there are signs of more and
more regional interconnections between countries, for example German Ship owners
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have been granted loans from banks in China, there is kind of interconnections
between countries, which I think is very important and interesting.

6. Risk Management
Q7. What about risk management strategies? Do you think they were in place; that
they should be or they should have been in place to protect the industry against the
current crisis?
Answer: I think, for example if the FFA’s market-if you use it as a hedging strategy
to cover your position in your market it is very useful but if you use it as has been
done a lot, not only in shipping in future context, if you use it as a speculating tool,
it is very dangerous. But in order to have a liberal financial market, those things have
to be allowed…Yeah, I think freight derivatives have to be allowed as every
speculator also somehow take a way risk from someone else who do not want to take
risk. I think freight derivatives are very important.
Q7 (Contd). You mean, this is the only way of managing risk in shipping?
Answer: No, shipping is inherently risky because of its cyclicality and the huge
financial investment you have to undertake. So, I think due to the cyclicality, you
have to face the fact that you have to have reserves in order to survive such crisis.
If you look at the Greeks, they know how; how to tap the market; to survive they
know when to buy when to sell; if you look at some German owners, they have not
relied on their gut feeling… They saw China and the bid demand represented by
some big liner companies and they just order ships on the very peak of the market
and now they are in trouble. I think you have to be very conservative in shipping and
I think that is your most natural risk management tool and also by keeping reserves,
try to cover your risk by joint ventures or even by diversifying in different tonnage in
my opinion.
Q8: Suppose we come back to the Greek example you just gave – You said it is the
timing of the investment which always help them come out safer of the game. So, how
do you think they always, manage to calculate the right timing?
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Answer: I have lots of Greeks in my class. About 50% are Greeks and they are all or
at least most of them are quite talented in numbers; in maths- that will be a very bad
generalisation but I think in they are in terms of economics and looking at the figures
and sensing what the figures tell in the long run,…that’s the biggest advantage they
have and they have been in shipping for a very long time and that’s family are
involved. If you look at public companies and if you look at the Greek company
where you have the old Captain and he has the son, he brings in the son and gives
him all the knowledge. They are very conservative. They have been in shipping very
long time with values passing from generation to generation, it is a long term
business; they have a very different view; they do not necessarily look at profits only,
as public companies do. The prime motive of being in shipping is tradition. Of
course, they time their investment and get lot of money but they stay in shipping
based on their experience and conservative outlook is what allow them to drive the
market in a correct way.

7. Financial crisis leads to shipping crisis?
Q9. When you say that the global crisis is very bad to the shipping industry, how do
you explain why it is so bad?
Answer: It is a bit tough question but it is a mix of both which makes it so lethal for
shipping. But I think if the shipping industry had to deal only with the supply issue
and so you are more likely to solve it in some way. If to the supply issue, you add
really large scale financial problem, then the whole basis of trade is somehow
crippled – e.g. you do not get letter of credit if you try to ship your cargo from port A
to port B, and it stays in the port, which is very imminent in the second part of 2008
or if you cannot finance your new buildings (which is a bad example but just to show
how it affects on the supply side),so if people like us earn less, consume less, in the
long run, it starts with the container then, it takes all the market. You consume less
energy eventually which in the end which then also affect the tanker market in a way
… yeah, in a way it is all interlinked and the financial crisis is really going to the
very roots of demand for tonnage.
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8. Crisis – Bane or boon?
Q10. You said that global crisis is very much problem to the shipping industry. Can
please you explain how is it so?
Answer: Basically it is on the demand side. If you look at demand for tonnage there
was 20% drop in volume transported and the 20% drop is something which never did
happen. It clearly shows the impact of the financial crisis and the lag effect. The
longer the time passes, the more people will be redundant, they lesser they consume
which has a lag effect on shipping. So, that’s the demand side and of course on the
financial side, you cannot afford to finance your new orders, that may have strain on
your cash and use your in house reserves and lot of companies will go out of
business…we have not seen lots of bankruptcies but there is lot to come, especially
in the liner market I think.
Q11. Some people believe that the global crisis may be a boon for the shipping
industry. Do you agree?
Answer: Of course it is not good because companies will go bankrupt and you never
know who is going to be affected. But in the long run, the level at which shipping
markets were trading over time were unsustainable, so in a way it is the cleansing
kind of crisis bring everyone back to be more conservative and more aware of the
industry.

9. Any other views or comments, suggestions:
Q12. Earlier you mentioned limitations in statistics and need for improvement.
Suppose you attempt use in statistics in providing better predictions, do you think
some kind of modelling which would be helpful?
Answer: I have no real answer to this. The future is always prone to errors. The
more people do it,..they do so using weighted average, by doing so, every broking
house their in house forecasting

I think they come up with something really

incredible which they might not be likely to share with you, so there is the need for
more transparency and more collaboration.
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Q13. But in the shipping industry is known to be very conservative (secretive). So,
how can we have more transparency when everyone tries to pull out on their own
resources or they have information?
Answer:As long as shipping is dominated by private interests, by private companies
it will be tough to achieve a high level of transparency as it happens in other
industries. Other industries are dominated by public co. which by law has to disclose
financial information to stakeholders. Shipping is mostly owned by private, so that
to wish for more transparency, it is very important but it is not very likely to happen.

Q. 14 Another thing is that because of private concentration, you have lots of
speculators who come into the business which distort the market in a way. Do you
there is need for some regulatory framework to limit the market?
Answer: The thing is that shipping is so international and one of the fundamental
issues that make trade and everything so lucrative is the fact that they are liberal in
nature. If you bring in too much regulation in the shipping market to avoid
speculation, then you restrict the liberal character which will be detrimental, I think.
Speculators are not always bad though there is risk and especially as speculators take
risk that someone else does not want to- so I think we should stick to that as
speculators bring more energy and competition in the market which I think is good.

Q. 15 How do you view the crisis and the shipping industry at the moment?
Answer:At the moment… uumh, I think the crisis is quiet at the moment, which I
find surprising, especially in the liner market. Look at those big liner companies –
they themselves have big exposure in the shipping industry and they still chartered
tonnage at very high rates and issue high invoices …there is not much renegotiation
which I think is not sustainable on the long run, unless, of course they have
undisclosed reserves. Other than that tanker for instance has only been recently
affected. So I think this is going to take a while as they try to stabilise things but if
you look at how they do it, ..like printing money in America, the same in UL, it is
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like laying up the foundation for the next crisis which may be inflationary so that the
whole system look better than it should be-shipping is in the same position as the
financial crisis – so it is not over yet, I think!
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Appendix 4 Briefings from Interviews
(i)

Brief 1

Date: 15 June 2009
Particulars: Alan
Written Questionnaire answers – 10 minutes
Questionnaire based interview – 20 minutes approx.
1. Financial crisis or shipping crisis-which is worse?
If we restrict our concern to the shipping industry related issues, it is certainly the
shipping crisis, though under the present recessionary conditions, it is hard to draw a
line between the two.

2. Shipping statistics-usefulness and reliability questioned?
Looking at statistics in context of the survey was beyond the remit of the IMO.
However, based on the personal opinion of the respondent in view of his previous
work experiences on the commercial aspects of the industry, shipping statistics are
believed to be meaningful input to the industry in guiding policy decisions.
For instance, presently with the IMO being heavily involved in the procedures
towards enforcing the ship recycling convention, statistics from the Lloyd’s register
of shipping were very useful in giving shapes to some of the regulations.

3. Shipping market segments
The differing reactions of the specific market segments are simply the result of the
key differences between the market that those vessels cater for and the operating
market conditions which differentiates one segment from another. For instead, in
case of the dry bulk market, time charters are usually negotiable and of shorter
duration as compared to tanker trade where suppliers are specialised agencies and
contract are long term.

115

4. Ship finance
With the present financial crisis, with limited ship finance options being available,
money available for investment in ships is reduced. Moreover, liquidity constraints
also affect demand for cargo which is transmitted to the industry through reduced
demand for transport services. As such what is ‘’bad news’’ for the new building
industry results into ‘’good news’’ for the demolition market, if one may say so.

5. Government Intervention
Presently, the timing of the crisis is critical for the ship recycling convention. It
serves to emphasise the need and urgency to regulate the demolition market. So,
from a regulatory perspective, at present it is crucial for government to seriously
consider its commitment towards the ship recycling convention than it would have
been under normal circumstances.

6. Financial crisis and shipping crisis –Is it depicting the chicken-egg situation?
From the representative of the IMO, the distinction between the financial crisis and
the shipping crisis is simple. Financial crisis means demand exceed supply, i.e. there
is not enough capital while shipping crisis is more to do with supply exceeding
demand.
Presently, it is a combination of two which is something different compared to
previous crises. As such the effect as well is fatal. We have on one side the financial
crisis, which is reducing demand for cargo and money (capital) available for
investment in ships whereas the shipping crisis is forcing the industry to get rid of
excess capacity.

7. Boon or bane?
From the regulatory perspective, bearing in mind safety and environmental
protection issues which is the mandate of IMO obviously, the current situation may
be perceived as being a boon on balance. Firstly, with the shortage of seafarers and
the increasing pressure that was being felt by the industry due to the upswing in
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demand for transport services, a crisis at another level was being anticipated. With
the sudden change in market conditions, we have the time to wisely invest in
manning prospects. On the environmental front, reduced demand for transport
services implies reduced consumption of fuel and subsequently reduced pollution as
a result of air emissions from ships!

8. Globalisation & IT
With globalisation & IT revolution, the players involved today are certainly more
wide ranging than before. As a result, as the gains are tremendous, it is normal that
the negative impacts be also far reaching. We cannot be all winners at all times!
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Brief 2
Date: 21 June 2009
Particulars: Alex
Written Questionnaire answers – 10 minutes
Questionnaire based interview – 20 minutes approx.
1. Financial crisis or shipping crisis-which is worse?
For the shipping industry, obviously the shipping crisis is worse. Prior to the crisis,
the huge order books was already raising concerns as one and all kept maintaining
that the boom was unsustainable! Yet investment in new buildings continued
growing. It is not rocket science to see that in its most basic form, it was simply
gambling, which very often takes place in ship investment. The consequence of the
uncontrolled gambling as being observed at industry level is the cancellation of
orders, vessels being laid up in view of feeble prevailing freight rates and
overwhelming scrap markets.

2. Shipping statistics-usefulness and reliability questioned?
People pay a lot to obtain statistics. Whether people should use them or not, people
do use them. For instance, if we look at the buoyancy of the Chinese and Indian
economy for the past five years, forecasts had been predicting that the growth would
not continue and they kept growing and building up optimism of investors and vice
versa. At times therefore, the limit to which reliance may be or should be placed on
statistics get blurred, which where experience of the players then make the difference
between those who survive crises and those who perish.

3. Shipping market segments
The tanker crisis is more critical (in the sense that it is concerned with carriage of
energy and the world needs energy to function!).
The dry bulk market is concerned with raw materials and the liner trade with end
products. So, in way, all the three segments though different in terms of the cargo
traded remains closely connected. What explain the differing responses in the
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specific segment actually might be the priority needs of people. Construction projects
are not a priority in times of troubles. So, the dry bulk sector was the first one to be
trimmed. Next came the liner trade and eventually as the need for transport services
were reduced so was the need for energy, which explains the lag in reaction of the
tanker industry. Therefore, impact first felt in the dry bulk and container market was
(reflected) passed on to the tanker trade in due course!

4. Ship finance
Ship finance is not an area which the respondent deals with and therefore, would
prefer to abstain from commenting on same.

5. Government Intervention
In case of government support to shipyards, beside looking at the industry’s short
term gain in terms of finance as actions are being taken to cut down the excess
capacity and we look at the government’s policies from a long term perspective, it is
reasonable in the sense that if the domestic industries are not supported, this will lead
to an invaluable loss of skills to the industry, which will be very difficult to get back
once it is lost.

6. Financial crisis and shipping crisis –Is it depicting the chicken-egg situation?
Every crisis is different. Shipping cycles is always there. There are booms, there are
also busts. The shipping industry always reacts to those. However, different crises
pop up at different times for different reasons.
Referring to the current crisis, clearly, one led to the other. Shipping services reflects
general world finance market and international trade obviously. Shipping is affected
by the demand for goods and services while effective demand actually requires the
not only the willingness but also the ability to pay. So, with the financial crisis
affecting players’ ability to pay, it is found that they are all interconnected and the
resulting impact on shipping markets and market segments likewise were anticipated.
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7. Boon or bane?
From the perspective of an institution committed to ensuring quality manning of
vessels, it is believed that had the credit crunch not manifested itself, the shipping
industry would still have to face a crisis situation sooner or later. Maybe the boon
would have perpetuated for longer period, had the financial crisis not precipitated the
downturn in shipping as well. However, this may not have been for the good of the
industry in every respect.
To support world trade, we need ships and to use ships we need seafarers. Prior to
the credit crunch and subsequent shipping crisis, the industry was already facing an
acute shortage of qualified manpower. The crisis at manning level was gaining
momentum as the boom positive growth continued. Had trade not dropped off, the
shortage of seafarers, employment of increasingly not yet fully qualified or
experienced seafarers may have resulted into more casualties at sea, loss of lives and
potential damage to environment… So, the credit crunch has in a way given more
time to the industry to take care of the looming crisis at manning level. However,
this will be possible, only if the time is used wisely! If not, the industry should brace
itself for the next crisis which may not again be financial-led but still have dramatic
impact on the industry as the financial crisis.

8. Globalisation & IT
On hindsight, with widespread globalisation and It revolution, it was expected most
people should have been able to see the so many unsecure loans on the world
subprime market, very easy loans in the shipping industry for new loans well in
advance!
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(ii)

Brief 3

Date : 23 June 2009
Particulars: Alf
Written Questionnaire answers – 10 minutes
Questionnaire-based interview – 20 minutes approx.
1. Financial crisis or shipping crisis-which is worse?
Financial crisis is certainly the worse as unlike shipping crisis since it affects
both the demand and supply factors for shipping services.
2. Shipping statistics-usefulness and reliability questioned?
Published statistics are base data. According to the normal practice in the banking
sector, for instance, this base-data are subjected to ‘’hair-cut’’ in banking
terminology. In other words, they are analysed in house and supplemented by
analysis usually sought from external valuers (e.g. Marsoft Statistics). They
usually provide information under differing scenarios from the high-ends to lowends.

3. Shipping market segments
50% of financing by the financial institution funds to shipping is allocated to
tankers, around 10% to container trade and logistics and the remaining usually
directed to support investment in the dry bulk sector.

4. Ship finance
RBS has been financing shipping for almost 250 years. Shipping is not only
about investment in ships, it is also about ship broking, ship registration and
insurance.
The bank traditionally focuses on strong players and usually maintains a
conservative approach to shipping finance. As an investment bank, therefore
priorities are given to quality projects. A major proportion of the funds available
are directed towards new buildings or five years old vessels. The bank is
normally reluctant to finance older vessels and is certainly not specialised to
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service the needs scrap traders in order to steer clear of the inherent risk
implications.

5. Government Intervention
In case of RBS, it was severely impacted by the crisis. Had it not been for
government intervention and assistance, RBS would have had to face
exceedingly dire circumstances. In this sense, government support was greatly
welcomed. Moreover, based on personal respondent’s reasoning, UK is a service
industry and government support excluded shipping. On the other hand, countries
like China are very much reliant on their manufacturing base so that government
support to the shipyards is reasonable as is the case of the UK government
towards its service sector.

6. Financial crisis and shipping crisis –Is it depicting the chicken-egg
situation?
What banks are being blamed for was on account of so called supply driven
investment in shipping. In other words, banks were expected to rationalise the
quality of cyclical market, anticipate the worse case scenario and put a stop its
lending activities to shipping projects on this basis. What is often forgotten it
seems is that banks are not regulators of the economy or any particular industry!
As a commercial investment banks, banks respond to cycles as any other
commercial entity. There might have been relatively easy loans to shipping
activities until recently, however, it should be noted that it was demand led.
Consequently, banks had no valid reason to curb investment for promising
projects.
To answer the question, whether, it is the chicken and egg situation? In a way,
yes and it is unfortunate that the financial crisis preceded the shipping crisis and
banks being blamed for not having had a ‘crystal ball’!
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7. Boon or bane?
It may be a boon in a way as banks shift its focus back towards ‘’core’’ clients
and scale back lending to consolidate its liquidity position. Assets that were being
chased not so long ago and adding to balance sheet growth are now being
subjected to revaluation. FFA’s used in the dry cargo side was rather
conservative. On the other hand, with regards to the offshore sectors, agreements
were built contracts by private investors so that it was becoming more of a
gambling tool than managing risk.
With regards to publications asserting that ‘’loan defaults turning banks into ship
owners’’ is certainly overstated as the question of exercising the ship arrests.
Banks strive to assist its customers as much as possible and avoid the situation of
foreclosure unless it is the last resort. Banks then turn to its ‘’friendly’’ customers
who are basically customers with strong liquidity position or services of ship
management companies for assistance.

8. Globalisation & IT
Globalisation and IT is no more an option. It is embedded in the industry for it to
survive and thrive.
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(iii)

Brief 4

Date : 25 June 2009
Particulars: Ali
Written Questionnaire answers – 10 minutes
Questionnaire based interview – 20 minutes approx.

1. Financial crisis or shipping crisis-which is worse?
For commodity trade to flourish, credit line is needed. If there is no cargo to be
transported, no ships are needed. As such ownership of vessels is no longer asset,
rather they become liabilities.
Without credit line, trading in the shipping business slows down resulting in
excess capacity (tonnage). For instance, if the grain transportation be taken as an
example, demand for panamax vessels has dried up. Suddenly, we have an excess
capacity for such vessels. Instead smaller vessels are being sought to minimise
cost and improve efficiency. Similarly, if we look at the dry bulk market, the
cheaper option for the Chinese industry would be to trade with Australia as
compared to continued transportation of iron ore from Brazil.

2. Shipping statistics-usefulness and reliability questioned?
With respect to statistics their reliability remains highly questionable, especially
in the present circumstances.
In the opinion of the respondent, it is believed that too many people rely on the
so-called ‘’experts’’ and their predictions, though they seem to get things wrong
more than right!
In shipping, there is no fixed formula for success or any hard and fast rule to be
always a winner. This is because of the uncertainty which prevails in the industry
and makes it all more challenging. Incidentally, therefore, shipping statistics are
only reliable so far as they are used merely as benchmark and not the core/central
element in investment decisions.
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3. Shipping market segments
With respect to the reaction of specific market segments, the reactions may be
summarised as follows:
Container market – It is a ‘dead’ market at present and it will certainly be the last
one to pick up!
Dry bulk market – It was the first one to crash but it was also the first one to pick
up as steel mills picked up again.
Tanker market – It reacts in response to oil price fluctuations. Bunker cost at
present, however, though it may be low, it only matters if cargo is available and
we have a fixture!

4. Ship finance
Currently, existing banks are dubious of shipping people. Instead they are more
focussed on key clients, with whom they share good relationships based on past
exchanges.
On the other hand, use of derivatives challenge the real fundamentals of the
shipping business. Use of derivatives by companies like Cargill, which ahs the
knowledge of the commodity market as well as the shipping market, they are in a
better posture and use of derivatives seem reasonably acceptable. However,
comparing the behaviour of ‘’crazy-people’’ who are out simply for making
money in the short term and overplay the derivatives as ‘’quasi-raw gambling’’,
they destroy the real fundamentals of the shipping business.

5. Government Intervention
Government intervention shows results in the long run. In the short run, from
history we have a number of state programs which are implemented and which
are not deemed as being good enough at macro level. They are said to be
falsifying the market.

However, looking beyond the need of the shipping

industry, the case of Chinese government supporting its domestic industry is
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certainly reasonable. If no such action is taken, this implies potentially large scale
unemployment, lower GDP growth, lower investment and similar ‘domino effect’
which generate a negative circle with far more serious implications on the world
economy as a whole in the longer run.

6. Financial crisis and shipping crisis –Is it depicting the chicken-egg
situation?
The current crisis is most certainly different from former crises. Respondent
believes that the current crisis is not part of the ‘normal’ shipping cycle. It has
been forced on the industry by virtue of the banking crisis led by the
subprime/mortgage business going bust!
However, it is also true to say that the shipping crisis itself was already being
invited by the very high order book for new buildings and older ships which were
still kept in service as one and all in the industry were driven by the greed for
more and more gain.
With the advent of the financial crisis, there was a ‘’knock-on’’ effect on key
industries which drives the shipping business such as the steel industry which
slowed down as well as the construction industry. For example, Dubai was
heavily engaged in massive construction projects which suddenly stopped. Why
were the projects stopped? Obviously, it was the consequence of the financial
crash. Reduced demand for construction materials implied reduced need for
transportation services and therefore for vessels of the related shipping market
segment.
It is therefore, very difficult to unlink the financial and shipping crisis in the
existing circumstances.

7. Boon or bane?
Value of ships was inflated as willingness to pay for them during the boom was
tremendous.
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The plight of capsize vessels were more dramatic. Investments in new buildings
were negotiated against five year charter rates. With the downturn, following the
astronomical fall in freight rates, the real worth of the vessel was totally distorted.
Similar example may be related to containerships. Under the German KG
scheme, astronomical investments were made in container ships and long timecharters were agreed. However, within one year, with the adverse conditions for
credit lines, stakeholders could no longer sustain such colossal rates as the
demand of manufactured goods, especially from China fell drastically. Vessels
were thus, laid up. The key question is why are assets laid-up? The answer is
simply because they are not assets anymore. This answers the first question.
From ship-owners perspective the crisis is undoubtedly a bane!

8. Globalisation & IT
Information flow being faster in today’s world resulted in more lags in reactions
in economies across the world. With the worldwide interlinks and connections as
a result of globalisation to facilitate trade, the crisis was global in dimension
much sooner than before.

9. Last word…
Traditional ship owners look at shipping from long-term perspective. For
example, Greek ship owners plan their business for 60 years ahead. However, as
at date, there are too many outsiders getting involved in the industry without a
feel for the business, driven simply by the eagerness in ‘’number-crunching’’!
The so-called financial ‘’Gurus’’ have turned ‘ship’ into a tool to make money so
that the real fundamentals of the shipping business was badly undermined with
too much attention focussed on making more and more money-rather than
provision of a service at a competitive rate; with the end result being obvious by
the disaster we are experiencing today.
Therefore, the lessons learnt from the current crisis should be to encourage
people in the industry not to move away from the real fundamentals and to stay
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away from ‘’fancy financial tools’’ which they are not familiar with and which
has the tendency to change the mindset driving the shipping business away from
business and to more of gambling. Shipping is only a function of transport but
lure by greed, more and more people comes into the business just to make easy
money. The popular adage of ‘’buy low-sell high’’ attracted speculators with
tremendous risk appetite who ended up creating a mass of greed which was
fuelled by the Chinese economy boom – who were willing to pay the abnormally
high prices - which again only serves to show how true it is that ‘’money follows
money’’!
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